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Preface 
The European Commission has appointed Copenhagen Economics to prepare a study on tax 
cooperation in an enlarged European Union. The objectives of the study are to: 
“Provide simulations on tax policies in the enlarged European Union. In 
particular, it will cover a significant part of the accession countries and the 
current European Union. 
The focus of the investigation will be the analysis of the economic consequences 
of corporate tax co-ordination in an enlarged EU.” 
A set of policy scenarios has been analysed to study the economic effects of tax cooperation. 
This final report provides detailed results and policy conclusions, including a description of the 
analysed scenarios, the underlying model and the features and limitations of the analytical 
framework. 
Copenhagen Economics has prepared the report in October 2004. The report is based on our 
draft final report of September 2004, our intermediate report of June 2004, our inception report 
of February 2004, the technical specifications of the contract covering the study and the 
scenario outline provided by the European Commission’s services. 
We gratefully acknowledge the constructive input received from the steering group of the study 
at the interim meetings in March, June and September of 2004. 
Comments regarding the study, including this report, may be sent directly to the project leader, 
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Executive summary 
There are 25 different systems for corporate taxation in the European Union. This creates tax 
obstacles that reduce the benefits of the Internal Market. Companies involved in cross-border 
transactions are most affected, for example through tax-induced obstacles to investment 
decisions. From a purely economic point of view, the main culprit is the large variation in 
effective corporate tax rates, driven by uncoordinated nominal corporate tax rates and different 
rules for calculating corporate tax bases. 
The purpose of this study is to evaluate the economic effects of different scenarios of tax 
cooperation in the enlarged European Union. The study develops scenarios for a common 
corporate tax base applicable in all EU Member States, for full harmonisation of tax bases and 
tax rates, and for the exchange of savings information in the context of personal income 
taxation. A published model is used to analyse the scenarios. The analysis leads to the 
following conclusions. 
Corporate tax cooperation can yield gains in GDP and welfare. This applies both to 
cooperation across the whole EU and to enhanced cooperation among subsets of member 
states. The magnitude of the potential gains is in the order of 0.5% for GDP and somewhat 
less for welfare. Taking the limitations of the modelling framework into account, this figure may 
prove to underestimate the effects of tax cooperation. 
The details of tax cooperation determine outcomes. Economic gains from tax cooperation 
cannot be taken for granted. Depending on the precise details of cooperation policies and the 
set of cooperating countries, gains can be reversed into losses. This calls for thorough 
analyses of specific policies before adoption. 
Individual country effects can be large and sometimes negative. Aggregate gains from tax 
cooperation do not mean that all member states will be better off. All scenarios considered 
leave some member states as winners and others as losers from reform. Individual countries 
may experience significant changes in economic activity, tax revenues and government 
budgets. An agreement on tax reform is likely to require elaborate compensation mechanisms. 
Enhanced cooperation is the most likely route towards tax cooperation. The large and 
diverse country effects suggest that enhanced cooperation for a subset of member states may 
be the most likely route towards tax cooperation. Both full harmonisation and tax base 
harmonisation across the EU as a whole will be very complicated to implement given the 
unanimity requirement on tax policy decisions. Cooperation among a subset of relatively equal 
member states will lead to less radical policy changes, but also smaller gains. This could 
constitute an important first step towards further policy reforms. Economic effects of tax cooperation in an enlarged European Union 
    Page 6 of 68 
In the context of personal income tax coordination, exchange of savings information 
reduces tax evasion. The most apparent effect of exchanging savings information with tax 
havens is a significant reduction in tax evasion, an important gain in itself. Aggregate GDP and 
welfare outcomes are small and will vary depending on the use of tax revenues. 
The financing of tax reforms is crucial. The choice of fiscal instrument for balancing 
government budgets can sometimes have a significant influence on the effects of corporate tax 
cooperation. This means that corporate tax harmonisation is likely to be bundled with additional 
tax policy reforms. 
The conclusions are based on an analysis of a large set of policy scenarios. The study first 
establishes a baseline scenario that captures the enlargement of the European Union without 
any changes in current, largely non-cooperative, tax policies. This scenario serves as a 
reference for evaluation of the cooperation scenarios. A second reference scenario models full 
harmonisation of both corporate tax bases and rates across the whole EU25. 
Between these two extremes – no cooperation and full harmonisation – the study develops two 
comprehensive sets of scenarios that capture the effects of partial tax cooperation. First, tax 
base harmonisation is thoroughly studied for the cases of uncoordinated tax rates, a minimum 
corporate tax rate, and labour tax adjustments to stabilise tax revenues. Second, international 
exchange of personal savings information is analysed in the cases of full cooperation within the 
EU25 and full cooperation with external tax havens. These scenarios are an important 
prerequisite for enforcing residence-based capital income taxation for individuals. The 
comparison of the different policy scenarios suggests that full harmonisation of both the 
corporate tax rate and tax base, at the weighted averages of current rates and bases, is the 
economically most interesting policy option. 
A number of commonly debated issues fall outside the scope of the study and are left to future 
efforts. First, the economic literature has yet to develop and agree on how to model corporate 
tax compliance costs. This study has consequently not taken lower compliance costs into 
account when reporting the gains from corporate tax cooperation. Still, the study implicitly 
sheds some light on the issue on compliance costs. The large adjustments to tax bases that 
sometimes are required by harmonisation indicate that existing de facto rules for calculating 
taxable corporate income differ significantly across countries. This indicates that tax base 
harmonisation could result in sizeable reductions in compliance costs. 
Second, more comprehensive studies should analyse the effects on GDP and welfare of issues 
such as e.g. EU-wide corporate income consolidation (i.e. allowing cross-border loss offsets), 
harmonisation towards the broadest possible tax base, effects of tax cooperation on tax 
competition and increased competition in the Internal Market following tax reforms. By 
including such effects into a broader modelling framework, a more comprehensive analysis of 
the effects of tax cooperation could be performed. This may capture more benefits of tax 
cooperation than is included in the current model. 
 Economic effects of tax cooperation in an enlarged European Union 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
The purpose of this study is to evaluate the economic effects of tax cooperation in the enlarged 
European Union with a focus on corporate taxes. Tax cooperation in the EU has been a topic 
for public and academic debate for a long time, but real progress has been modest and many 
issues remain to be researched and negotiated (European Commission, 2003). Heterogeneity 
has grown as a result of the enlargement (Eurostat, 2004) and the unanimity requirement for 
tax policy decisions will continue to be a challenge to comprehensive reforms. 
Current corporate tax systems are remarkably heterogeneous and differ in the rules 
determining taxable profits as well as in statutory tax rates. Figure 1-1 illustrates the large 
differentials between current statutory rates in the EU. Average statutory corporate tax rates 
are significantly lower in the new member states than in the EU15, and the difference between 
the highest and the lowest rate is currently more than 25 percentage points.  
















Note: The graph shows unweighted averages. 
Source: Copenhagen Economics based on KPMG (2004). 
 Economic effects of tax cooperation in an enlarged European Union 
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The case for tax cooperation is based on concerns regarding distortions of investment 
decisions, administrative costs and tax competition (see European Commission 2001a, 2001b 
for a more comprehensive analysis). These concerns are briefly summarized below. 
The influence of different tax regimes can cause companies to pursue socially sub-optimal 
strategies, i.e. by making investment decisions based on tax considerations. Wide-spread use 
of profit-shifting to low-tax jurisdictions can also be detrimental to the long-term revenue-raising 
capacities of member states. Variations in effective corporate tax rates can influence the 
localization of investments and differences in statutory corporate tax rates create incentives for 
firms to locate their profits in low-tax jurisdictions.  
Moreover, the mere existence of 25 different systems for corporation taxation in the Internal 
Market has detrimental effects on the administrative burden of companies. Tax obstacles 
increase compliance costs and can hinder exploitation of the full benefits of the Internal Market. 
Quantitative assessments of compliance costs are rare, but estimates range from 2-4% of total 
corporate tax revenues raised (Lannoo & Levin, 2002). A recent and comprehensive 
Commission study on the topic estimates that compliance costs in the EU correspond to 1.9% 
of total taxes paid in the EU (European Commission, 2004). 
Tax competition as a motivation for tax cooperation is supported by theoretical as well as 
empirical arguments. The theoretical case for tax cooperation revolves around a possible 
under-provision of public goods, caused by tax competition that leads to tax rates being set 
below the socially optimal level in order to attract mobile capital. Nominal and average effective 
tax rates have indeed been on a path of steady decline in the European Union since the mid 
1990s. Still, there is only limited evidence for a “race to the bottom” and tax competition can 
alternatively be seen as a useful disciplinary constraint on government budgeting. Harmful 
forms of tax competition have moreover been addressed by the essentially implemented Code 
of Conduct (see European Commission, 2003). 
Depending on which underlying problem is being highlighted, the variety of concerns that spurs 
interest in tax cooperation can motivate a range of alternative policies. This study will provide 
an understanding of the consequences of tax cooperation using a thorough quantitative 
economic analysis. The first step of the analytical process is therefore to design credible and 
relevant policy scenarios for the subsequent modelling. The next chapter provides detailed 
outlines of the analysed scenarios. Economic effects of tax cooperation in an enlarged European Union 
    Page 9 of 68 
Chapter 2 Scenario definitions 
This chapter presents a detailed outline of the analysed scenarios. The scenarios have been 
chosen and designed to allow for an analysis of the welfare effects of relevant policy options. 
Tax cooperation encompasses a wide range of possible tax instruments and coordination 
policies. A key challenge is to identify the economic effects of cooperation for specific tax policy 
instruments in a transparent and tractable manner. Consequently, each scenario generally 
reflects a limited number of changes to tax policies. Analyzed together, the complete set of 
scenarios addresses a very comprehensive set of relevant tax policy issues. The scenarios 
furthermore facilitate an analysis of associated policy challenges, outlining strategic incentives 
and their policy implications. 
Some scenarios include the modelling of enhanced cooperation, in which only a subset of 
Member States decide to engage in tax policy cooperation. The definition of appropriate 
subsets is based on objective criteria, e.g. similarities in tax systems or extent of economic 
integration between countries. 
The scope of the study mandates the inclusion of the new member states, in addition to the 
current EU, in the scenarios. The obvious ambition is complete coverage of the EU25 and all 
EU member states have indeed been included in the analysis. 
To avoid any confusion in the following sections, it is useful to define that the term ‘harmonised 
tax rate’ means that the affected member states apply the same nominal rate. In the same 
vein, when the term ‘harmonised tax base’ is used, it means that all member states face the 
same rules for calculating the corporate tax bases in their respective territories. 
The scenarios can be conceptually divided into three largely independent sets, as depicted in 
Figure 2-1. Full harmonisation of corporate tax bases and tax rates provides a reference point 
illustrating the effects of full cooperation between member states. Harmonisation of tax bases 
is the starting point for a set of scenarios where member states engage in partial cooperation. 
A final set of scenarios examine the effects of enhanced exchange of information in the 
savings area. The complete collection of scenarios allows for testing of a very comprehensive 
set of policy options for tax cooperation. Economic effects of tax cooperation in an enlarged European Union 
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Figure 2-1: Overview of scenarios 
 
Source: Own scenario definitions. 
2.1. Baseline scenario 
The purpose of this scenario is to provide a benchmark for the subsequent analysis. The 
scenario consequently entails the addition of the ten new member states to the old EU15 
without any changes in tax systems, coordination mechanisms or existing political agreements. 
All other scenarios will subsequently be compared to this benchmark scenario to evaluate the 
economic outcomes of alternative policies. 
The primary effect of enlargement, in relation to development of the economic model, is 
defined as increased capital mobility between the EU15 and the new member states. The 
appropriate level of capital mobility between the new member states and the EU15 can be 
attained by modifying investors’ preferences or the overall transaction costs for investments in 
foreign stocks and bonds. The purpose of an adjustment is to capture portfolio behaviour that 
is commonly explained in terms of risk, return and co-variances of different types of assets. 
Taking into account that economic activity between the old and new member states has been 
steadily rising since the early 1990’s, it is assumed that investors’ preferences have not been 
changed by enlargement per se. Instead, enlargement is modelled purely as a decrease in 
transaction costs between the EU15 and the new member states. It is assumed that 
transaction costs between the EU15 and the new member states will be equal to the average 
of transaction costs within the EU15. 
Regarding the Savings Directive (2003/48/EC), this scenario assumes that the directive is fully 
implemented. The model interpretation is that there exists an efficient and automatic system for 
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international reporting of the interest incomes of individuals between member states. The 
implication is that a certain share of the interest incomes of individuals originating from Member 
States of the EU25 are reported to the proper residence country authorities, with the 
exceptions mandated by the directive. It is assumed that initial reporting systems are imperfect 
and only report 75% of interest incomes. National reporting systems are assumed to be at least 
as efficient as bilateral reporting. For Belgium, Luxemburg and Austria, no interest incomes are 
reported and a withholding tax of 15% is levied. This assumption is based on the withholding 
tax rates applying until 2007 under current conditions. 
The Parent-Subsidiary Directive (90/435/EEC) with recent amendments (2003/123/EC) 
eliminates withholding taxes on dividends paid by a subsidiary to a parent. The directive is 
assumed to be implemented in all new member states in addition to the old EU15. Accordingly, 
the model parameter representing the withholding tax rate on dividends from foreign 
subsidiaries is set to zero. 
It is furthermore assumed that the Code of Conduct is fully implemented in the EU25. The 
modelling implication is that all companies in a member state face the same rules for taxation 
and that no preferential tax treatment is given to multinational subsidiaries or non-residents. 
This follows from the model structure and does not imply a change to any model parameter. 
2.2. Full harmonisation 
This scenario envisages full harmonisation of corporate tax bases and tax rates in the EU25, 
providing a valuable reference with respect to policies that go beyond the baseline scenario but 
fall short of complete harmonisation. An implication of harmonising both tax bases and tax 
rates is that transfer pricing with the purpose of profit-shifting to low-tax jurisdictions within the 
EU is largely eliminated. Furthermore, distortions to investment decisions caused by corporate 
tax considerations will significantly decrease. Some differences will remain, primarily because 
of different systems for double-taxation alleviation. 
Harmonisation of tax rates implies that the statutory corporate tax rate will be set to a fixed 
value across the EU25. The harmonised tax rate will apply equally to retained and distributed 
profits. 
Harmonisation of tax bases means that all member states face the same rules for calculating 
the corporate tax bases in their territories, i.e. for determining the differential between true 
profits and taxable profits. The broadness of the tax base in the model is determined by the 
rate of capital depreciation and the proportion of interest payments that may be deducted 
against taxable corporate income. Other capital allowances are not permitted and investment 
neutrality properties of the tax base are not explicitly considered. In this scenario, the rate of 
capital depreciation and the proportion of deductible interest payments will be identical for all 
member states, creating a harmonised tax base across the EU25. 
Tax base harmonisation is often discussed in connection to the introduction of consolidated 
accounting. Under consolidated accounting, multinational firms would have a single set of 
accounts for their EU-wide operations. Tax bases would then be distributed among member 
states according to an apportionment mechanism. A move to consolidated accounting would in 
terms of the model require a redefinition of the objective function of multinational firms. This 
would imply a conceptual change in firm behaviour that is inconsistent with current business 
practices. The critical complication is however that it is impossible to find data to characterise a Economic effects of tax cooperation in an enlarged European Union 
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behaviour that does not currently exist in the EU1. Separate accounting is consequently applied 
in this scenario. Since governments will retain their national tax bases there is no need to 
define apportionment mechanisms. 
An important motivation for harmonising tax bases is to decrease tax compliance costs for 
firms with multinational operations in the Internal Market. Tax compliance costs are generally 
estimated to amount to 2-4% of corporate tax revenues (Lanno & Levin, 2002). Solid evidence 
on the composition and causal mechanisms of compliance costs is however scarce and 
inconclusive.2 In recognition of the problem, the Commission recently launched a compre-
hensive survey that estimated compliance costs in the EU to 1.9% of taxes paid. Explicit 
modelling of compliance costs is, however, not feasible before conclusive theoretical and 
empirical findings are available. In addition, systematic data needed for modelling does 
currently not exist as current surveys are based on perceived costs. Compliance costs can 
consequently not be included in the analysis. 
Two sub-scenarios will be considered, with tax rates and tax bases harmonised at levels 
corresponding to respectively the unweighted average corporate tax rate and base of the EU25 
and the average corporate tax rate and base of the EU25 weighted by GDP3. Each sub-
scenario is furthermore tested for three different subsets of cooperating member states. 
It should be noted that the legal basis for cooperation among a subset of countries is based on 
the concept of enhanced cooperation under the Treaty of Nice, which mandates that at least 8 
Member states must decide to move forward. 
The perhaps most interesting subset consists of the 12 Member States that have adopted the 
euro as their common currency. Harmonisation of tax bases would remove yet an important 
obstacle to economic integration within the euro-zone. It is accordingly both theoretically useful 
and of high policy relevance to analyse deeper integration within the euro-zone.  
Two additional subsets are also tested, the EU15 and the so called EU15-A, which refers to the 
EU15 member states that share the same accounting view. The EU15-A includes all EU15 
member states except the United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark and the Netherlands. 
All other parameters are assumed to be unchanged compared to the baseline scenario. 
2.3. Tax base harmonisation 
Tax base harmonisation is an important component of policies that aim to enhance appropriate 
tax cooperation within the EU while maintaining the right of member states to sovereignty over 
national tax policies. By harmonising tax bases, tax rate differentials become more transparent 
and less complicated to interpret. Harmonisation of corporate tax bases is therefore a useful 
starting point for the most comprehensive set of scenarios in the study.  
                                                           
1 The Danish corporate tax system for example allows cross-border consolidation. However, it does not include an 
apportionment mechanism, which, depending on its definition, could also affect firms' behaviour.   
2 Several studies have been made on the subject of tax compliance costs. Slemrod and Blumenthal (1993) have 
provided figures for the USA, Pope et al (1990) for Australia, Sandford (1995) for the United Kingdom, Erard 
(1997) for Canada, and Allers (1994) for the Netherlands. The Ruding Committee has surveyed EC and EFTA 
countries (European Commission, 1992). 
3 Future developments of this study could envisage simulations of corporate tax base harmonisation towards the 
broadest possible tax base, as this can be favoured policy in practice. Economic effects of tax cooperation in an enlarged European Union 
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These scenarios share two characteristics with the full harmonisation scenario. First, harmoni-
sation of tax bases means that all member states face the same rules for calculating the 
corporate tax bases in their territories, i.e. for determining the differential between true profits 
and taxable profits. The broadness of the tax base in the model is determined by the rate of 
capital depreciation and the proportion of interest payments that may be deducted against 
taxable corporate income. In this scenario, the rate of capital depreciation and the proportion of 
deductible interest payments will be identical for all member states, creating a harmonised tax 
base across the EU25. Since most member states allow for full deductions of interest 
payments, harmonisation will almost exclusively apply to the rate of capital depreciation. 
Second, separate accounting is still applied, i.e. multinational firms will not have consolidated 
accounts for their EU-wide operations. Since governments will retain their national tax bases 
there is no need to define apportionment mechanisms. A move to consolidated accounting 
would in terms of the model require a redefinition of the objective function of multinational 
firms. This would imply a sweeping change in firm behaviour that is inconsistent with current 
practices. The critical complication is however that it is impossible to find data to match a 
behaviour that does not currently exist in the EU. 
Three sub-scenarios are based on the common foundation of harmonised tax bases. They are 
defined in the following sections. 
Tax base harmonisation with uncoordinated tax rates 
This scenario assumes that tax bases are harmonised across some or all member states, but 
with the nominal corporate tax rates of the individual member states kept fixed at current 
levels. The scenario is tested with cooperation first among all member states, then for subsets 
of cooperating countries. As for full harmonisation, enhanced cooperation is tested for the Euro 
zone, the EU15 and the EU15-A. 
All other parameters are assumed to be unchanged compared to the baseline scenario. 
Tax base harmonisation with budget neutral tax revenues 
Harmonisation of tax bases across countries with different tax systems will have different 
effects on the tax revenues of national governments. Notably, countries with currently broad 
tax bases may suffer significant losses in corporate tax revenues after harmonisation. 
Countries with narrow tax bases may conversely perceive sizeable losses in their ability to 
attract investments. 
As a result, the possibility to stabilise tax revenues at a level where government budgets are 
unaffected after a harmonisation of tax bases may be crucial for creating political momentum 
for reform. An intuitive response to changes in tax bases is to adjust tax rates. This scenario 
analyses the implications of adjusting labour tax rates to a level where government budgets are 
stabilised. It should be duly noted that the choice of adjusting labour taxes only serves as an 
example for the analysis. The necessary adjustments could also have been made to e.g. 
consumption taxes.  
The choice of adjusting a tax rate other than the corporate tax rate is based on two important 
considerations. First, if corporate tax rates were to be adjusted to fully account for tax base 
changes, effective corporate tax rate differentials in the EU would remain unchanged, thus 
retaining a significant barrier to the proper functioning of the Internal Market. Second, the large 
corporate tax revenue increases implied by tax base harmonisation would mean that the 
corporate tax rates for certain countries, e.g. Germany, would have to be cut to unrealistically 
low levels.  Economic effects of tax cooperation in an enlarged European Union 
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It is accordingly assumed that tax bases are harmonised across some or all member states, 
but that labour tax rates are endogenously adjusted to neutralise budget effects. Total tax 
revenues may not be completely unchanged, since variations in interest rates can increase the 
cost of government debt interest payments. The scenario is tested with cooperation first among 
all member states, then for the Euro zone, the EU15 and the EU15-A. 
All other parameters are assumed to be unchanged compared to the baseline scenario. 
Tax base harmonisation with minimum tax rate 
Testing various levels of minimum tax rates is primarily motivated by a desire to minimize 
competition for “paper profits”, i.e. tax competition for transferred corporate profits. A closely 
related motivation is to secure a minimum level of revenue-raising capability among Member 
States while maintaining some national sovereignty over tax policy. The formal case for a 
minimum corporate tax rate is based on the negative spill over effects that arise when a 
country lowers its corporate tax to attract mobile capital. Conversely, countries that use their 
tax autonomy to choose higher corporate tax rates create positive spill over effects. 
This scenario assumes that tax bases are harmonised across the EU25 and that all Member 
States are obliged to levy at least a minimum corporate tax rate. It is assumed that Member 
States with current statutory rates below the minimum rate will raise their corporate tax rates to 
match the minimum rate. All other Member States are assumed to keep their tax rates 
unchanged. It is worth noting that profits can still be shifted outside the EU. 
The scenario is tested for minimum tax rates of 20%, 25% and 30%, respectively. All other 
parameters are assumed to be unchanged compared to the baseline scenario. 
2.4. Exchange of savings information 
The total tax burden on income from capital includes corporate taxes as well as personal taxes 
on income and wealth. Personal capital income taxes are indeed a key component of the 
overall taxation on capital incomes, but cross-border enforcement can be problematic. Even if 
corporation taxes are harmonized, national governments will retain control over personal taxes 
on interests, dividends and capital gains. Taxation of personal capital income can thus 
constitute a way for governments to tax capital income according to national preferences, 
provided that residence-based taxation is possible. 
Effective exchange of information in the savings area can provide member states with more 
room for manoeuvre in the field of personal income taxation, making it less contentious to give 
up autonomy in the area of corporate taxation. If a member state finds that a harmonized 
corporate tax implies an inappropriately low level of taxation, it can add personal taxes on 
dividends and capital gains at the shareholder level. Conversely, if a harmonized corporate tax 
is considered too high, corporate tax revenue can finance tax credits to shareholders. 
The Savings Directive creates the necessary framework for residence-based taxation of 
interest income paid to individual savers. The scope of the directive is however limited by a 
number of non-cooperating countries. Firstly, Belgium, Luxembourg and Austria are allowed to 
apply a withholding tax for a transitional, but possibly indefinite, period. Secondly, tax havens 
continue to provide opportunities for tax evasion. The effects of removing these shortcomings 
are evaluated by analysing two sub-scenarios (as compared to a baseline scenario where Economic effects of tax cooperation in an enlarged European Union 
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exchange of savings information is assumed to be implemented between all EU member states 
but Belgium, Luxembourg and Austria) 4. 
Full exchange of information within the EU 
This scenario assumes that Belgium, Luxembourg and Austria exchange information with all 
other EU member states. It is assumed that 75% of interest incomes of individuals originating 
from Belgium, Luxembourg and Austria are actually reported to the proper residence country 
authorities. This assumption will be tested in the sensitivity analysis. National reporting 
systems are assumed to be at least as efficient as bilateral reporting.  
All other parameters are assumed to be unchanged compared to the base line scenario. 
Full exchange of information with external tax havens 
This scenario assumes that not only Belgium, Luxembourg and Austria exchange information 
with EU member states, but that tax havens also exchange information. It is specifically 
assumed that there is an efficient and automatic system for international reporting of the 
interest incomes of individuals between all member states, Switzerland and the tax haven. 
Switzerland has been included in the analysis to provide a more accurate picture of the 
potential effects of exchanging information with tax haven jurisdictions, even though automatic 
reporting goes beyond current agreements. National reporting systems are assumed to be at 
least as efficient as bilateral reporting. Again, it is assumed that 75% of interest incomes of 
individuals are reported to the proper residence country authorities. 
All other parameters are assumed to be unchanged compared to the base line scenario. 
2.5. Summary of scenarios 
For reference, a summary of all scenarios is provided in Table 2.1 below. 
                                                           
4 Future developments of this study could envisage simulations of the full application of the Savings directive, i.e. 
departing from a baseline scenario where there would be no exchange of information between EU countries 
whatsoever.  
 Economic effects of tax cooperation in an enlarged European Union 
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EU-15-A.  n/a n/a n/a 
Note: B, L, AT refers to Belgium, Luxemburg and Austria, respectively. The Euro-zone refers to the 12 Member 
States of the European Union that have adopted the euro as their common currency. EU-15-A refers to the subset 
of EU-15 countries that shares the same accounting view (i.e. legal image as opposed to fair value accounting). 
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Chapter 3 Results 
This chapter provides an overview of aggregate results for the scenarios. Detailed results are 
available in Appendix I where results on a wide range of variables are reported for all member 
states. 
Some scenarios include the modelling of enhanced cooperation, in which only a subset of 
member states decide to engage in tax policy cooperation. To avoid any confusion, the subsets 
of member states for which enhanced cooperation is analysed are: 
•   EU15: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom (15 
countries). 
•   Euro zone: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain (12 countries). 
•   EU15-A: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Portugal, Spain and Sweden (11 countries). 
The reporting highlights the welfare and revenue effects of tax cooperation at both the 
European Union level and the member state level. The focus is on three major economic 
measures: GDP (at market prices), consumer welfare and total tax revenues. 
Consumer welfare includes the welfare effects of consumption and saving, as well as the 
negative welfare incurred from increased working hours. The welfare measure is thus broader 
than the GDP measure. The results report percent changes relative to initial welfare. 
The measure of total tax revenues covers all direct and indirect taxes. It is important to note 
that changes in corporate taxes will affect not only corporate tax revenues, but also a range of 
other sources of tax revenue. Changes in total tax revenues will generally tend to be 
significantly smaller than changes in corporate tax revenues. Government budgets are, 
however, balanced in all scenarios. Unless otherwise noted, it is assumed that government 
budgets are balanced by adjusting income transfers to offset any gains or losses in tax 
revenues. 
3.1. Economic effects of corporate tax harmonisation 
To better understand the results, it is helpful to consider the economic effects of corporate tax 
harmonisation taken into account in this study. In short, the results captured in the model 
framework are driven by two simultaneous effects. Economic effects of tax cooperation in an enlarged European Union 
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First, harmonisation will increase the tax burden in some countries and decrease it in other 
countries. The policy changes required can be very significant. Individual country results are 
primarily influenced by the change in the overall tax burden. A larger national tax burden leads 
to higher tax revenues, but a loss in GDP due to more economic distortions. A smaller tax 
burden conversely leads to tax revenue drops and GDP gains caused by higher economic 
efficiency5. There is consequently a classic trade-off between taxation and economic efficiency. 
When individual country results are reviewed, changes in the corporate tax rate and tax base 
(reported in the detailed tables in Appendix I) will largely explain the economic outcomes. If it is 
assumed that current taxation systems reflect national preferences, economic gains from lower 
taxes must be evaluated together with the costs of deviating from the national preferences. 
Second, harmonisation of both tax rates and tax bases reduces cross-country differences in 
effective tax rates, leading to a more efficient allocation of capital across cooperating countries 
(see Sørensen, 2004a). The gains from more efficient capital allocation can be thought of as 
the pure value-added from tax cooperation. The aggregate gains from more efficient allocation 
of capital will always be positive as long as tax cooperation indeed leads to less heterogeneous 
effective corporate tax rates. This will always be the case for full harmonisation, but not 
necessarily when only tax bases are harmonised.  
The aggregate effect of changes to the total level of taxation often dominates the effects of 
more efficient allocation of capital. Large shifts in total tax revenues will in many cases lead to 
large shifts in GDP. This means that economic gains from tax cooperation cannot be taken for 
granted (in this standard modelling framework). Depending on the specific details of 
coordination policies (e.g. the point of reference for corporate tax harmonisation) and the set of 
cooperating countries, aggregate gains can be reversed into aggregate losses. The details of 
policy reform matter, as will be shown in the following sections. 
3.2. Full harmonisation of the corporate tax rate and tax base 
The economic effects of full harmonisation of both corporate tax rates and tax bases are 
illustrated in Figure 3-1. The corporate tax rate is harmonised at respectively 27.2% and 
32.6%, corresponding to the unweighted and the GDP-weighted average of current rates. In 
the same way, the corporate tax base is harmonised at respectively the unweighted and the 
GDP-weighted average of current tax bases. 
                                                           
5 Other effects that link tax revenues with economic growth measured by GDP could also exist (e.g. using tax 
revenues to increase public investment that fosters economic growth), but are not taken into account in the model. Economic effects of tax cooperation in an enlarged European Union 
    Page 19 of 68 















Harmonisation at unweighted averages Harmonisation at weighted averages
 
Note: The graph shows percentage changes in EU totals. The harmonised corporate tax rate is respectively 27.2% 
and 32.6%, corresponding to the unweighted and GDP-weighted average of current rates. The harmonised 
corporate tax base is calculated as respectively the unweighted and GDP-weighted average of current bases. 
Government budgets are balanced by adjusting income transfers. 
Source: CETAX simulations. 
 
In both cases, corporate tax harmonisation results in GDP and welfare gains. Harmonisation at 
unweighted averages leads to a significant drop in tax revenues. The results are driven by two 
simultaneous effects. As previously explained, the aggregate effect of changes to the total level 
of taxation can often dominate the effects of more efficient allocation of capital. This is also 
indicated in the figures above and below, where large shifts in total tax revenues result in 
correspondingly large shifts in GDP. 
The case of full harmonisation at the weighted average tax rate and base is especially 
interesting to consider. There is a gain in GDP of around 0.4%, a very small welfare gain, but 
no aggregate decrease in aggregate tax revenues for the EU25 as a whole. The aggregate 
gain in both GDP and welfare are indicative of the positive effect of more efficient capital 
allocation, and can be thought of as the pure value-added from tax cooperation. 
Though the aggregate effects of tax cooperation are relatively modest at the EU level, 
individual country effects are large and divergent. There are both winners and losers among 
member states. Figure 3-2 and Table 3.1 illustrate that individual countries will experience 
sizeable effects on economic activity and tax revenues. Economic effects of tax cooperation in an enlarged European Union 
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Note: The graph shows the biggest positive and negative changes in member state outcomes. The scenario 
considered is full harmonisation of the corporate tax rate and tax base at unweighted averages. Government 
budgets are balanced by adjusting income transfers. 
Source: CETAX simulations. 
 
Table 3.1: Individual country effects of full harmonisation at unweighted averages 
Member state 








3. Change in 
GDP (%) 




Austria -6.8  0.1  0.7  -0.7 
Belgium -6.8  43.2  3.2  -0.5 
Denmark -2.8  57.4  1.8  -0.3 
Finland -1.8  73.9  1.6  -0.7 
France -7.8  36.2  2.4  -1.0 
Germany -10.8  -54.6  -1.6  0.6 
Greece -7.8  -3.2  1.1  -0.5 
Ireland 14.7  7.8  -1.0  1.7 
Italy -5.8  23.5  1.4  -1.5 
Luxembourg -3.2  201.7  3.7  -3.2 
Netherlands -7.3  52.5  2.7  -1.4 
Portugal -0.3  53.8  1.2  -1.2 
Spain -7.8  -11.0  0.4  -0.3 
Sweden -0.8  44.5  1.1  -0.4 
United Kingdom  -2.8  122.1  2.2  -2.7 
Cyprus 12.2  -12.7  -1.2  4.4 
Czech Republic  -0.8  134.5  2.3  -2.3 
Estonia 1.2  -73.4  -2.5  5.2 
Hungary 11.2  162.7  0.5  0.1 
Latvia 12.2  98.4  0.1  1.5 
Lithuania 12.2  176.1  0.4  0.9 
Malta -7.8  -40.4  -1.1  0.1 
Poland 8.2  -24.0  -1.1  1.6 
Slovak Republic  8.2  1.9  -0.7  2.3 
Slovenia 2.2  -48.2  -1.7  1.3 
Note: A negative (positive) figure in column 2 indicates a broadening (narrowing) of the corporate income tax base. 
Government budgets are balanced by adjusting income transfers. 
Source: CETAX simulations. 
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Two important conclusions can be drawn from the numbers in Table 3.1. First, harmonisation 
of the corporate tax base implies very large changes to the rules for determining taxable 
corporate income in some countries, as illustrated by the large changes recorded in column 2. 
In particular, Germany is an outlier in the EU15 because of its narrow tax base. This can be 
intuitively understood by comparing Germany’s relatively high statutory corporate tax rate to its 
relatively low ratio of corporate tax revenue to GDP, as illustrated in Table 2 of Appendix III6. 
Second, for almost all countries, a gain in GDP comes at the cost of lower tax revenues. 
Conversely, a loss in GDP is generally accompanied by higher tax revenues. As previously 
noted, this is because changes in the level of taxation tend to outweigh all other effects at the 
country level. As previously noted, government budgets are balanced by adjusting income 
transfers to offset changes in tax revenues. 
Enhanced cooperation 
The difference between harmonisation at the unweighted or GDP-weighted average corporate 
tax rate and tax base is more pronounced when considering the case of enhanced 
cooperation, as illustrated in Figure 3-3 and Figure 3-4 below. 
For the cases of enhanced cooperation analysed here, harmonisation at unweighted averages 
tends to imply losses in GDP and gains in tax revenues. Harmonisation at weighted averages 
yields opposite results. 

















EU15 Euro zone EU15-A
 
Note: The graph shows percentage changes in sub-group totals. The harmonised corporate tax rate is 31% for the 
EU15, 31.5% for the Euro zone and 33% for the EU15-A, corresponding to unweighted subgroup averages. The 
harmonised corporate tax base is calculated as the unweighted subgroup average. Government budgets are 
balanced by adjusting income transfers. 
Source: CETAX simulations. 
 
                                                           
6 The relatively low ratio of corporate tax revenues to GDP in Germany may be influenced by other factors than the 
narrowness of its corporate tax base, e.g. the relatively large fraction of unincorporated firms. Economic effects of tax cooperation in an enlarged European Union 
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EU15 Euro zone EU15-A
 
Note: The graph shows percentage changes in sub-group totals. The harmonised corporate tax rate is 34% for the 
EU15, 35% for the Euro zone and 35% for the EU15-A, corresponding to weighted subgroup averages. The 
harmonised corporate tax base is calculated as the weighted subgroup average. Government budgets are balanced 
by adjusting income transfers. 
Source: CETAX simulations. 
 
The differences are to a large extent driven by the composition of subgroups and individual 
country impacts, most notably by Germany, which has the largest economy in the EU. As 
previously noted, the German economy is an outlier in the sense that its tax base is very 
narrow compared to other EU15 countries. Again, this can be intuitively understood by 
comparing Germany’s relatively high statutory corporate tax rate to its relatively low corporate 
tax revenues.  
When harmonisation takes place at the unweighted average tax rate and tax base, the German 
tax base is drastically increased. This leads to a sharp increase in total corporate tax burden 
(despite the fact that the unweighted tax rate averages are lower than the weighted tax rate 
averages)7, and an accompanying fall in economic activity (as a result of introducing more 
distortions to the economy). Because Germany constitutes around one fifth of the total EU 
economy, this effect has a strong impact on the results for enhanced cooperation at un-
weighted averages. Though harmonisation at the weighted average tax rate and base may 
seem a tempting alternative for enhanced cooperation, it does imply that the rules for deter-
mining the harmonised tax base must be heavily oriented towards recreating the effects of 
German tax legislation.  
3.3. Tax base harmonisation 
The economic effects of tax base harmonisation are in a sense conceptually different from full 
harmonisation. When only the tax base is harmonised, effective corporate tax rates will remain 
very heterogeneous. In fact, since countries with relatively broad tax bases tend to have 
relatively low tax rates, and vice versa, tax base harmonisation will often lead to an increase in 
effective tax rate differences if tax rates are assumed to remain unchanged. The implication is 
                                                           
7 This suggests that, in these scenarios, the economic outcomes are more influenced by the harmonised tax base 
than by the level of tax rate harmonisation. Economic effects of tax cooperation in an enlarged European Union 
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that cross-country distortions to investment decisions may remain or even increase, thereby 
eliminating any gains from the improved capital allocation that follows full harmonisation. 
Still, tax base harmonisation can result in economic gains as illustrated in Figure 3-5. The 
gains in GDP and welfare are, however, primarily caused by the overall drop in taxation. The 
decrease in tax revenues is the effect of harmonising only one of the two components 
determining corporate tax revenues, i.e. the tax base and the tax rate. In this case, where only 
the corporate tax base is harmonised, the result is a drop in overall taxation. Again, lower 
taxation will reduce economic distortions and increase economic activity at the cost of lower tax 
revenues. As noted previously, government budgets are balanced by adjusting income 
transfers to offset changes in tax revenues. 

















Harmonisation at unweighted averages Harmonisation at weighted averages
 
Note: The graph shows percentage changes in EU totals. Corporate tax rates are kept constant at current levels. 
Government budgets are balanced by adjusting income transfers. 
Source: CETAX simulations. 
 
As was the case for full harmonisation, individual country effects are significantly larger than 
the aggregate for the EU as a whole. There are still clear winners and losers from 
harmonisation. Figure 3-6 shows that the span between biggest positive and negative 
outcomes is considerable. Detailed figures are provided in Table 9 of Appendix I. Economic effects of tax cooperation in an enlarged European Union 
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Note: The graph shows the biggest positive and negative changes in member state outcomes. The scenario 
considered is harmonisation at the unweighted average tax base. Government budgets are balanced by adjusting 
income transfers. 
Source: CETAX simulations. 
 
In the following, only tax base harmonisation at the unweighted average corporate tax base is 
considered. The general economic mechanisms will, however, also apply to harmonisation at 
the GDP-weighted average tax base. 
Enhanced cooperation 
Enhanced cooperation on tax base harmonisation at the unweighted average tax base will 
yield losses in both GDP and welfare. Total tax revenues will increase as illustrated in Figure 
3-7. Again, these results are driven by individual country effects in general and by the 
economic outcomes in Germany in particular. The German economy is especially hard hit by a 
large increase its tax base and effective corporate tax rate. 




















EU15 Euro zone EU15-A
 
Note: The graph shows percentage changes in sub-group totals. The harmonised corporate tax base is calculated 
as the unweighted average of subgroup tax bases. Government budgets are balanced by adjusting income 
transfers. Economic effects of tax cooperation in an enlarged European Union 
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Source: CETAX simulations. 
Minimum tax rate 
Tax base harmonisation is often considered in connection with requirements on minimum tax 
rates. A minimum tax rate can have two primary effects. First, it prohibits tax competition below 
the defined level. Second, for countries where the minimum tax rate becomes binding it will 
contribute towards full harmonisation of their effective tax rates. This means that a binding 
minimum tax rate will lead to economic gains from more efficient allocation of capital across 
countries. 
The aggregate economic effects of tax base harmonisation with a minimum tax rate are 
summarized in Figure 3-8. All analyzed scenarios yield small increases in GDP. The 
relationship between GDP and tax revenues is somewhat more complex. The imposition of 
both a 25% and a 30% minimum tax rate results in overall gains of both GDP and total tax 
revenues. Again, it should be noted that government budgets are balanced by adjusting 
income transfers to offset any changes in tax revenues. 
Again, the results are driven by the two effects on taxation levels and capital allocation. As the 
minimum tax rate increases, it becomes binding for a larger number of countries. The 25% rate 
is binding for 7 member states and the 30% rate for 13 member states. This gradually leads to 
a higher level of aggregate taxation and contributes negatively to total GDP. However, as more 
countries are bound by the minimum tax rate, cross-country differences in the effective 
average corporate tax rates decrease. This leads to economic gains from more efficient 
allocation of capital across countries. 
At the level of harmonisation implied by the minimum tax rates of 25% and 30%, the capital 
allocation gains outweigh the losses from economic distortions caused by higher taxation. 



















0% 20% 25% 30%
 
Note: The graph shows percentage changes in EU totals. The scenario with a 0% minimum tax rate corresponds to 
tax base harmonisation with uncoordinated tax rates and is restated for reference. Government budgets are 
balanced by adjusting income transfers. 
Source: CETAX simulations. 
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Budget neutral tax revenues 
Harmonisation of tax bases across countries with different tax systems will have very divergent 
effects on the tax revenues of national governments. When tax revenues decrease, painful 
budget cuts may become necessary. As a result, the possibility to stabilise tax revenues after a 
harmonisation of tax bases may be crucial for creating political momentum for reform. 
The scenario analyses the implications of stabilising national tax revenues at a level where 
government consumption and income transfers remain unchanged. This is done by adjusting 
labour tax rates. It should be duly noted that the choice of adjusting labour taxes only serves as 
an example for the analysis. The necessary adjustments could also have been made to e.g. 
consumption taxes. Total tax revenues may change slightly, since changes in interest rates 
can increase the cost of government debt interest payments. 



















Financing through adjusted income transfers Labour tax financing
 
Note: The graph shows percentage changes in EU totals. The scenario with budget balancing through adjusted 
income transfers is restated for reference. 
Source: CETAX simulations. 
 
Figure 3-9 shows that tax base harmonisation can result in positive effects on GDP, welfare 
and total tax revenues. Compared to the reference scenario, the aggregate shortfall in tax 
revenues is compensated by increased labour taxes. The distortionary effect of the new labour 
taxes reduces GDP, but by a very small amount since the implied change to labour tax rates is 
minimal and labour supply is less elastic than the supply of capital. It is sufficiently small to still 
leave a gain in both GDP and welfare for the EU as a whole. The results consequently reflect 
that labour taxes are less distortionary than corporate taxes at the margin. This is also likely to 
be the case for e.g. consumption taxes. The slight increase in total tax revenues is necessary 
to cover increased costs for servicing existing government debt. 
The economic effects of stabilising government budgets through adjustment of the labour tax 
rate are more evident when considering enhanced cooperation on tax base harmonisation. 
Figure 3-7 showed that tax base harmonisation with budget balancing through adjustments of 
income transfers resulted in relatively large increases in total tax revenues, caused by a rise in 
corporate income taxes.  When labour taxes are adjusted to neutralise budget effects, the 
increased revenue from corporate income taxes is used to lower labour taxes. 
As illustrated in Figure 3-10, which should be compared with Figure 3-7, the cut in the 
distortionary tax on labour is enough to create a small welfare gain, although not large enough 
to reverse the overall fall in GDP. The welfare gain is primarily driven by a fall in overall Economic effects of tax cooperation in an enlarged European Union 
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unemployment. The small decrease in total tax revenues is explained by a slight decrease in 
the costs of servicing existing government debt. 





















EU15 Euro zone EU15-A
 
Note: The graph shows percentage changes in subgroup totals. 
Source: CETAX simulations. 
 
3.4. Exchange of savings information 
The final set of analysed scenarios concern exchange of information in the savings area. The 
Savings Directive creates a framework for residence-based taxation of interest income paid to 
individual savers, but automatic exchange of information is yet to be fully implemented by all 
member states. The baseline scenario assumes that there is already automatic exchange of 
information implemented between all EU member states, except for Austria, Belgium and 
Luxembourg. 
The economic effects of extending the exchange of information to include Austria, Belgium and 
Luxembourg are close to zero for the EU as a whole, as illustrated in Figure 3-11. This is a 
result of the policy impact on the total capital stock being very modest. Had the full exchange of 
savings information been simulated from a baseline with no exchange of information 
whatsoever, the economic effects would be more significant. This could be a possible 
extension of the study for future research. 
Total tax revenues increase very slightly as a result of an increase in total taxable interest 
income. GDP and welfare is not affected for the EU as a whole. Exchange of savings 
information increases the share of taxable interest income, thereby reducing the net return on 
investments in interest-bearing assets, but the overall effect is minimal. 
The effects are somewhat more pronounced for Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg than for the 
EU as a whole. With only a 15% withholding tax and no reporting of interest income to 
residence countries in the baseline, exchange of information leads to drops in inward portfolio 
investment and withholding tax revenues. This affects national incomes and thereby welfare. 
The result is also a slight decrease in the total stock of business capital. This translates into a 
small negative effect on economic activity. Economic effects of tax cooperation in an enlarged European Union 
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As for corporate tax cooperation, the aggregate effects of exchanging savings information 
depend on how changes in tax revenues are handled. If increases in tax revenues from 
exchanging information were used e.g. to lower distortionary taxes, the economic outcomes 
would be slightly more favourable. 

















EU Austria Belgium Luxembourg
 
Note: The graph shows percentage changes in EU25 and national totals. The baseline withholding tax rate for 
interest income from Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg is 15%. Government budgets are balanced by adjusting 
income transfers. 75% of household interest income is reported to residence country authorities (and taxed at the 
personal tax rate on interest income of the residence country). 
Source: CETAX simulations. 
 
The picture changes only slightly when tax havens also exchange information, as illustrated in 
Figure 3-12. The primary aggregate effect, compared to exchanging information only within the 
EU, is an increase in total tax revenues. Its small magnitude is a result of the portfolio 
investment in tax haven bonds constituting only a small share of total portfolio investment in 
bonds.  Economic effects of tax cooperation in an enlarged European Union 
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EU Austria Belgium Luxembourg
 
Note: The graph shows percentage changes in EU25 and national totals. The baseline withholding tax rate for 
interest income from Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg is 15%. Exchange of information takes place with 
Switzerland and the tax haven. Government budgets are balanced by adjusting income transfers. 75% of household 
interest income is reported to residence country authorities. 
Source: CETAX simulations. 
 
The biggest change is to the extent of tax evasion. Table 22 in Appendix I documents that 
investors decrease their portfolio holdings of interest-bearing assets in the tax haven by up to 
80%. 
3.5. Sensitivity analysis 
The sensitivity analysis focuses on the effects of assumptions regarding strategic policy 
parameters. For corporate tax cooperation, the composition of sub-groups for enhanced 
cooperation is the most important and debateable parameter in the different scenarios. Still, the 
most contentious policy assumptions concern the exchange of savings information, which will 
therefore receive most attention. First, initial withholding tax rates on interest income from 
Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg will vary in accordance with the Savings Directive. Second, 
the effectiveness of automatic reporting systems can be more or less efficient than assumed. 
Detailed results by country are provided in Appendix II. 
Enhanced cooperation 
When engaging in enhanced cooperation, a preferred sub-group would consist of only those 
member states that are better of from reform. Unfortunately, within the standard modelling 
framework used in this study, the economics of corporate tax cooperation does in practice not 
allow for a scenario where all individual member states are unambiguously left better off. The 
formation of winners and losers from tax cooperation is a result of initial differences in national 
systems of taxation. If there were no initial differences, there would be no gains from 
cooperation. 
This effect has been analysed for the case of enhanced cooperation on tax base harmonisation 
in the EU15. The original scenario, with 15 cooperating member states, was modified to 
exclude those countries that experienced losses in both GDP and welfare.8 Figure 3-13 
                                                           
8 The excluded countries are Austria, Germany, Greece, Ireland and Spain. Economic effects of tax cooperation in an enlarged European Union 
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illustrates the results of tax base harmonisation at respectively the unweighted average base of 
the remaining ten member states, and the original unweighted average tax base of the EU15. 




















EU15 (average EU15 tax base)
Initially losing member states excluded (average subgroup tax base)
Initially losing member states excluded (average EU15 tax base)
 
Note: The graph shows percentage changes in subgroup totals. The excluded member states are Austria, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland and Spain. The original EU15 figures are restated as a reference. Government budgets are 
balanced by adjusting income transfers. 
Source: CETAX simulations. 
 
The results show that tax base harmonisation for the new subgroup still results in GDP and 
welfare losses if the harmonised tax base reflects the new subgroup composition. Aggregate 
effects are smaller, but new losers have visibly been formed and individual country results 
have a large impact on the aggregate outcome. 
The picture changes if tax base harmonisation for the new subgroup is performed at the level 
of the unweighted average tax base of the EU15, as in the original scenario. The harmonised 
tax base does then not reflect the new subgroup composition and the policy change effectively 
leads to a reduction of the total tax burden. This increases economic activity and welfare. 
The primary conclusion of the sensitivity analysis on enhanced cooperation on tax base 
harmonisation is that the details of the policy change matter greatly for the economic 
outcomes. Both the composition of cooperating subgroups and the chosen level of 
harmonisation have large impacts. It should also be noted that there always will be winners 
and losers from reform if harmonisation takes place at a level where individual member state 
differences are taken into account. 
Exchange of savings information 
Two important assumptions on the character of policy reform in the area of savings taxation 
need specific attention. First, initial withholding tax rates on interest income from Austria, 
Belgium and Luxembourg will vary in accordance with the Savings Directive. Second, the 
effectiveness of automatic reporting systems can be assumed to vary. 
The assumption that the withholding tax rate applying to interest income is 15% is only valid for 
the first three years of the so called transitional period for which Austria, Belgium and 
Luxembourg are exempt from exchanging information. The applicable withholding tax rate 
according to the Savings Directive is 20% for the next three years, and 35% thereafter. Economic effects of tax cooperation in an enlarged European Union 
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The two scenarios for exchange of savings information are therefore repeated for the two 
cases of baseline withholding tax rates of 20% and 35%, respectively. The results of the 
sensitivity analysis presented here should consequently be compared to the results presented 
in Figure 3-11 and Figure 3-12. 
Figure 3-14 shows that the difference between applying a 15% and a 20% initial withholding 
tax rate is minimal. The situation is somewhat different when the initial withholding tax rate is 
set at 35% which is sufficiently high to deter a significant amount of inward portfolio investment. 
When Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg start exchanging information and scrap the high 
withholding tax, portfolio inflows increase and cause small GDP gains, as illustrated in Figure 
3-15. The abolition of withholding taxes still results in significantly reduced tax revenues. 

















EU Austria Belgium Luxembourg
 
Note: The graph shows percentage changes in EU and national totals. The baseline withholding tax rate for interest 
income from Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg is 20%. Government budgets are balanced by adjusting income 
transfers. 
Source: CETAX simulations. 
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Note: The graph shows percentage changes in EU and national totals. The baseline withholding tax rate for interest 
income from Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg is 35%. Government budgets are balanced by adjusting income 
transfers. 
Source: CETAX simulations. 
 
For the scenario where exchange of information takes place both within the EU and with tax 
havens, Figure 3-16 and Figure 3-17 show that the results are similar to exchange of 
information only within the EU. As in the original scenario, the results are driven by changes in 
portfolio flows within the EU, which dominate the effects of exchanging information with the tax 
havens. 
Figure 3-16: Exchange of savings information within the EU and with tax havens (20% 

















EU Austria Belgium Luxembourg
 
Note: The graph shows percentage changes in EU and national totals. The baseline withholding tax rate for interest 
income from Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg is 20%. Exchange of information takes place within the EU and with 
Switzerland and the tax haven. Government budgets are balanced by adjusting income transfers. 
Source: CETAX simulations. 
 
Figure 3-17: Exchange of savings information within the EU and with tax havens (35% 
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Note: The graph shows percentage changes in EU and national totals. The baseline withholding tax rate for interest 
income from Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg is 35%. Exchange of information takes place within the EU and with 
Switzerland and the tax haven. Government budgets are balanced by adjusting income transfers. 
Source: CETAX simulations. 
 
The previous exchange of information scenarios assume that automatic reporting systems for 
interest income from Belgium, Austria and Luxembourg will cover 75% of household interest 
income. It should also be analysed if the outcomes of exchange of information differ if tax 
enforcement is more or less efficient than the baseline assumption. Figure 3-18 shows the 
results of assuming that only 50% of interest income is reported to residence country 
authorities within the EU and Figure 3-19 illustrates the effects of assuming perfect reporting. 
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Note: The graph shows percentage changes in EU and national totals. The baseline withholding tax rate for interest 
income from Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg is 15%. Government budgets are balanced by adjusting income 
transfers. 50% of household interest income from Belgium, Luxembourg and Austria is reported to residence country 
authorities. 
Source: CETAX simulations. 
 
In both cases, the aggregate results for the EU as a whole are close to zero, as was the case 
for 75% reporting. 
With exchange of information, Belgium, Luxembourg and Austria lose their withholding tax 
revenues, but portfolio inflows actually increase if only 50% of interest income is reported. The 
result is an increase in total capital stocks and more positive GDP effects than in the case of 
75% reporting.  
If automatic reporting systems are working perfectly, the results are similar to the original 
scenario where 75% of interest income is reported. In both cases, the effective tax rate on 
interest income increases as a result of efficient enforcement and abolished withholding taxes. 
Total tax revenues increase very slightly for the EU as a whole as a result of a higher share of 
taxable interest income. Economic effects of tax cooperation in an enlarged European Union 
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Note: The graph shows percentage changes in EU and national totals. The baseline withholding tax rate for interest 
income from Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg is 15%. Government budgets are balanced by adjusting income 
transfers. All household interest income from Belgium, Luxembourg and Austria is reported to residence country 
authorities. 
Source: CETAX simulations. 
 
3.6. Comparison of policy scenarios 
To sum up the model results and to facilitate a direct comparison of different policy options, this 
section provides summary tables with results from the different scenarios. Table 3.2 shows that 
full harmonisation at weighted averages is the most attractive policy option for corporate tax 
cooperation if the overall level of taxation is to be kept unchanged for the EU as a whole. 
Larger gains can be achieved only by significantly lower taxation resulting in lower tax 
revenues. 
Table 3.2: Comparison of full harmonisation and tax base harmonisation in the EU 










GDP 0.79  0.38 0.17 0.34 
Welfare 0.21  0.07 0.04 0.06 
Tax revenues  -0.56  0.01 -0.17 -0.29 
Note: The table shows percentage changes in EU totals. Government budgets are balanced by adjusting income 
transfers. Full harmonisation refers to harmonisation of both the corporate tax rate and tax base. 
Source: CETAX simulations. 
 
The picture is more complex for the case of enhanced cooperation. Still, full harmonisation at 
weighted averages again appears as the most interesting policy option. Table 3.3 illustrates 
that only full harmonisation at weighted averages consistently results in both GDP and welfare 
gains. Economic effects of tax cooperation in an enlarged European Union 
    Page 35 of 68 
Table 3.3: Comparison of enhanced cooperation scenarios 
  Full harmonisation  Tax base 
harmonisation 
 Unweighted  averages  Weighted averages Unweighted average 
  EU15 Euro-z  EU15A  EU15 Euro-z  EU15A EU15  Euro-z EU15A 
GDP -0.05  -0.16  -0.40  0.44  0.53  0.52 -0.53 -0.69 -0.76 
Welfare 0.09  0.09  0.04  0.10  0.10  0.09 -0.05 -0.07 -0.08 
Tax 
revenues  0.05 0.24 0.38  -0.20  -0.13  -0.15 0.28 0.52 0.55 
Note: The table shows percentage changes in subgroup totals. Government budgets are balanced by adjusting 
income transfers. Full harmonisation refers to harmonisation of both the corporate tax rate and tax base. Euro-z 
refers to the Euro zone. 
Source: CETAX simulations. 
 
The scenarios for corporate tax cooperation also analyse tax base harmonisation with a 
minimum corporate tax rate and budget neutral tax revenues, respectively. For the case of a 
minimum tax rate, the scenario with a rate of 25% is the most interesting policy option if the 
overall level of taxation is to be kept unchanged for the EU as a whole. Tax base 
harmonisation with budget neutral tax revenues is also an interesting alternative from an 
economic point of view, since both GDP and welfare gains can be realized without tax revenue 
losses. 
Table 3.4: Comparison of minimum tax rate and budget neutral tax revenue scenarios 
  Minimum tax rate  Budget neutral 
tax revenues 
  20 %  25 %  30 %  
GDP 0.14  0.10 0.03 0.16 
Welfare 0.04  0.02 -0.01 0.04 
Tax revenues  -0.10  0.01 0.13 0.02 
Note: The table shows percentage changes in EU totals. Government budgets are balanced by adjusting income 
transfers. 
Source: CETAX simulations. 
 
Finally, regarding exchange of savings information, the results in section 3.4 clearly indicate 
that exchange of savings information with tax havens is relatively more beneficial for the EU 
than exchange of savings information only with Belgium, Luxembourg and Austria. Still, the 
aggregate effects on the EU as a whole are very small. 
The comparison of the different policy options suggests that full harmonisation of both the 
corporate tax rate and the corporate tax base, at the weighted averages of current rates and 
bases, is the most interesting option from an economic point of view. As previously noted, this 
is because full harmonisation at weighted averages comes closest to realizing the benefits 
from improved capital allocation without affecting the level of taxation. Economic effects of tax cooperation in an enlarged European Union 
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Chapter 4 Policy implications 
The study shows that corporate tax cooperation can result in aggregate gains for the EU. The 
magnitude of the potential gains is in the order of 0.5% for GDP and somewhat less for 
welfare. This applies both to cooperation across the whole EU and to enhanced cooperation 
among subsets of member states. The comparison of the different policy options suggests that 
full harmonisation of both the corporate tax rate and tax base, at the weighted averages of 
current rates and bases, is the economically most interesting policy option (in terms of higher 
GDP) among the scenarios tested. 
The relatively modest magnitude of the gains is explained by the continued existence of other 
distortions to the free movement of capital within the EU (see Sørensen, 2004a). Tax rules for 
household and institutional investors still differ across member states. Investors are 
furthermore home-biased in their decision making, which reduces the substitutability of assets. 
Moreover, a significant part of total capital stocks is invested outside the corporate sector, 
particularly in housing capital. Corporate tax harmonisation alone is therefore not enough to 
equalize the cost of capital across the EU 
Aggregate gains from tax cooperation does not mean that all member states will be equally 
well off. All scenarios considered leave some member states as winners and others as losers 
from reform. Individual countries will experience significant changes in economic activity, total 
tax revenues and government budgets. 
Unfortunately, the standard economics of corporate tax cooperation does not allow for a 
scenario where all individual member states are better off in the absence of compensating 
international transfers. The formation of winners and losers from tax cooperation is a result of 
initial differences in national systems of taxation. If there were no initial differences, there would 
be no gains from cooperation. Taking the distributional effects of corporate tax cooperation into 
account will therefore be a crucial obstacle to policy reform. 
4.1. Distributional effects 
To understand the distributional effects of corporate tax cooperation, it is necessary to 
recognize the two primary factors influencing the economic outcomes. 
First, reductions of cross-country differences in effective tax rates lead to more efficient 
allocation of capital across the EU. The aggregate gains from more efficient allocation of 
capital will always be positive as long as tax cooperation indeed leads to more equalized 
effective corporate tax rates. This will always be the case for full harmonisation, but not 
necessarily when only tax bases are harmonised. Economic effects of tax cooperation in an enlarged European Union 
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Second, harmonisation of the corporate tax rate or tax base will affect the overall level of 
taxation in individual member states (unless reforms are designed to be revenue-neutral by 
shifting the tax burden or tax cuts to other taxes). The tax burden will increase in some 
countries and decrease in others. A larger total tax burden will almost invariably lead to a fall in 
GDP and welfare. A smaller tax burden will generally lead to a rise in GDP and welfare. There 
is consequently a classic trade-off between taxation and economic efficiency. The fact that 
changes in the overall level of taxation is a main driver of individual member state results is not 
surprising, but may have problematic policy implications when there are distributional effects. 
Specifically, in any group for which corporate tax harmonisation takes place and where gains 
are unevenly distributed, there will be demands for compensation of member states that are 
left worse off. Any compensation scheme must identify winners and losers. This is where 
problems may emerge. If losers are defined as those countries where tax revenues fall off as a 
result of the reforms, the implication would be that countries suffering drops in GDP would 
compensate countries with gains in GDP. If, on the other hand, losers are defined as those 
countries where GDP decreases as a result of the reforms, the implication would be that 
countries suffering drops in tax revenues would compensate countries with gains in tax 
revenues. Both options would prove hard to accept for policy makers. 
It should also be noted that economic gains from tax cooperation cannot be taken for granted. 
The model indicates that, depending on the specific details of cooperation policies and the set 
of cooperating countries, aggregate gains can be reversed into aggregate losses. The details 
of policy reform matter, as discussed in the following sections. 
4.2. Enhanced cooperation 
The large and diverse country effects suggest that enhanced cooperation for a subset of 
member states may be the most likely route towards tax cooperation. Both full harmonisation 
and tax base harmonisation across the EU as a whole would be very complicated to implement 
given the unanimity requirement on tax policy decisions. The simulations suggest that 
cooperation among a subset of relatively equal member states would, on the contrary, lead to 
less radical policy changes, but also smaller gains. This could constitute an important first step 
towards further policy reforms. 
The unanimity rule for tax policy decisions implies that all countries have an equal say when 
deciding on the definition of a harmonised tax base. Given the general tendency of 
governments to favour national sovereignty on corporate taxation, the unanimity rule in theory 
makes harmonisation at a level close to the unweighted average of current systems most 
relevant. In practice, a move towards the widest possible definition of the corporate tax base 
can also be a favoured policy. 
Harmonisation at the weighted average of current tax rates and tax bases implies that large 
economies are given more say when it is decided upon the rules for determining the 
harmonised tax base and tax rate. The study shows that this makes more economic sense, but 
it implies a larger dent in national sovereignty. Political will for reform would thus be an 
important factor for the outcome of corporate tax cooperation. 
Although the choice of the specific level of harmonisation may seem a purely technical issue, 
the policy implications are more profound. The study shows that there is a large difference 
between harmonisation at the unweighted and weighted averages of current corporate tax 
rates and bases. For enhanced cooperation on full harmonisation, the difference is a question 
of either aggregate gains or aggregate losses. Enhanced cooperation may therefore be 
preferred because of the need for very specific agreements on the details of tax cooperation.  Economic effects of tax cooperation in an enlarged European Union 
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A decision to engage in tax cooperation needs to be carefully researched and followed by a 
detailed agreement in order to avoid unwanted economic effects for cooperating member 
states. This will be more probable to succeed if negotiations can be held between only a 
subset of member states. 
4.3. Financing tax reforms 
Whether they are positive or negative, the revenue effects of tax cooperation must be 
absorbed in some way. The choice fiscal instrument for balancing government budgets can 
sometimes have a significant influence on the effects of corporate tax cooperation. In fact, the 
often large country level effects on tax revenues mean that corporate tax cooperation would be 
likely to be bundled with additional tax policy reforms. 
For both full harmonisation and tax base harmonisation, it would not be realistic to envision 
adjustments of solely corporate tax rates to stabilize revenues for all member states. The 
required changes would be too large to be practically feasible. As an alternative, this study has 
therefore analysed the effects of adjusting labour tax rates to balance government budgets. 
In the case of tax base harmonisation, the model shows that bundling corporate tax 
cooperation with labour tax reforms can result in positive gains in both GDP, welfare and tax 
revenues. Increasing labour taxes to reduce corporate tax revenue shortfalls would, however, 
increase unemployment. Such reforms may prove equally painful as reforms requiring cuts in 
income transfers or other public expenditure. 
The scenarios analysing exchange of savings information provide some insight into the 
possibilities of governments to more efficiently tax personal capital income. The results indicate 
that effective exchange of information may contribute towards more national autonomy in the 
field of personal income taxation if information exchange included tax havens. The positive 
effects of exchanging savings information would be reinforced if increased tax revenues were 
used to lower for example labour or capital income taxes.  
The model suggests that it is, however, not until high withholding tax rates are applied that 
Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg would have incentives to exchange information. The results 
also show how investors can adjust their allocation of capital from financial assets to primarily 
housing capital. Policy makers must consequently consider the breadth of investment options 
available to investors, providing ample legal opportunities to escape high taxation. 
The study shows that tax evasion using tax havens would decrease drastically as a result of 
exchanging information. This implies that exchange of information with tax havens may result 
in a significant political gain, in addition to any economic gains. 
4.4. Compliance costs 
An important motivation for corporate tax cooperation is to decrease tax compliance costs for 
firms with multinational operations in the Internal Market. The comprehensive European Tax 
Survey (European Commission, 2004) estimates perceived compliance costs (for company 
taxation and VAT) at 1.9% of taxes paid. Regrettably, explicit modelling of compliance costs is 
not feasible before conclusive theoretical and empirical findings are available. The formal 
model analysis of this study has consequently not taken lower compliance costs into account 
when reporting the gains from corporate tax cooperation. 
Still, this study implicitly sheds some additional light on the issue on compliance costs. The 
large adjustments to tax bases that sometimes are required by harmonisation indicate that 
existing  de facto rules for calculating taxable corporate income differ significantly across Economic effects of tax cooperation in an enlarged European Union 
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countries. This suggests that tax base harmonisation could result in sizeable reductions in 
compliance costs. This study therefore underestimates the gains form tax cooperation. 
To get a more comprehensive picture of the economic effects corporate tax cooperation, this 
macro-level study can be complemented by the micro-level European Tax Survey. The 
European Tax Survey produced several important findings concerning compliance costs. First, 
the survey found that compliance costs impose a relatively larger burden on small- and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) than on large firms. The survey indicates that perceived 
compliance costs in SMEs may amount to up to 30.9% of taxes paid. Given the significant 
share of SMEs in the EU economy, there may be significant gains from easing their 
compliance cost burden. 
Second, The European Tax Survey also shows that compliance costs are an obstacle to the 
smooth functioning of the Internal Market. The survey suggests that firms with subsidiaries 
abroad experience higher compliance costs, and that compliance costs increase with the 
number of subsidiaries abroad. 
In short, the European Tax Survey finds that current systems for corporate taxation in the EU 
hinder the smooth functioning of the Internal Market and imposes a particularly heavy burden 
on SMEs. Though the direct economy-wide impact of compliance costs may be modest9, the 
indirect effects of obstacles to the Internal Market may be significantly higher. Policy makers 
should therefore take into account the benefits from increased cross-border activity and the 
growth potential of SMEs when considering the issue of corporate tax cooperation. 
4.5. Limitations of the study 
Despite the highly specialised modelling framework used in this study, there is ample scope for 
improvements for future studies. This section outlines some limitations of this study that could 
be improved on, and that should be taken into account when evaluating the results of this 
study: 
•   The complexity of Member States’ legislation defining company tax bases is difficult to 
incorporate in a detailed manner in the model. The tax base harmonisation in the 
model almost exclusively applies to a calibrated rate of effective capital depreciation. 
This means that some country-specific policies may not be fully captured.  
•   Multinational firms do not have consolidated accounts for their EU-wide operations. 
Moving to consolidated accounting would imply a change in firms' behaviour which 
was not possible to include in the model. Therefore, the study can not be regarded as 
an assessment of the gains of moving to an EU tax system for multi-jurisdictional 
corporate taxation based on consolidation of firms' EU-wide income. 
•   As mentioned in the previous section, the study does not estimate the gains related to 
lower compliance and administrative costs that would result from the harmonisation of 
corporate tax bases.  
•   The model does not capture the dynamics of fiscal interactions between Member 
States, i.e. the reactions of Member States to each other's fiscal policies. In practice, 
however, phenomena of harmful tax competition may exist as countries compete to 
                                                           
9 Assuming that corporate taxes constitute on average 3% of GDP in the EU and that tax cooperation reduces 
compliance costs with 25%, the reduced compliance costs amount to 0.015% of GDP. Economic effects of tax cooperation in an enlarged European Union 
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attract investment and capital. Taking into account dynamic effects of harmful tax 
competition could strengthen the case for tax cooperation.  
•   The model does not take into account some dynamic effects, e.g. a possible increase 
in the number of new start-up firms as a consequence of tax reforms, or the 
exploitation of economies of scale or scope for firms that decide to expand across the 
EU following tax cooperation. 
•   The set of scenarios analysed, though large, is not able to cover all possible tax 
cooperation scenarios. Other scenarios of tax cooperation can be envisaged for future 
analysis. For example, the harmonisation of tax bases towards the broadest possible 
definition could be an interesting policy option.  
By including the above effects into a broader modelling framework, a more comprehensive 
analysis of the effects of tax cooperation could be performed. This may capture more benefits 
of tax cooperation than is possible in the current model. 
4.6. Summary of conclusions 
The policy analysis in the previous sections is summarized by the following conclusions: 
Corporate tax cooperation could yield gains in GDP and welfare. This applies both to 
cooperation across the whole EU and to enhanced cooperation among subsets of member 
states. The magnitude of the potential gains is in the order of 0.5% for GDP and somewhat 
less for welfare. Full harmonisation of both the corporate tax rate and base, at the weighted 
averages of current rates and bases, is the most advantageous policy option (in terms of 
aggregate gains in GDP) among the analysed scenarios. 
The details of tax cooperation determine outcomes. Economic gains from tax cooperation 
cannot be taken for granted (in this standard modelling framework). Depending on the precise 
details of cooperation policies and the set of cooperating countries, gains can be reversed into 
losses. This calls for thorough and comprehensive analyses of specific policies before 
adoption. 
Individual country effects could be large and sometimes negative. Aggregate gains from 
tax cooperation do not mean that all member states would be better off. All scenarios 
considered leave some member states as winners and others as losers from reform. Individual 
countries may experience significant changes in economic activity, tax revenues and 
government budgets. An agreement on tax reform could therefore require some form of 
compensation. 
Enhanced cooperation seems the most likely route towards tax cooperation. The large 
and diverse country effects suggest that enhanced cooperation for a subset of member states 
may be the most likely route towards tax cooperation. Both full harmonisation and tax base 
harmonisation across the EU as a whole could be very complicated to implement given the 
unanimity requirement on tax policy decisions. Cooperation among a subset of relatively equal 
member states could lead to less radical policy changes, but also smaller gains. This could 
constitute an important first step towards further policy reforms. 
The financing of tax reforms is crucial. The choice of fiscal instrument for balancing 
government budgets can sometimes have a significant influence on the effects of corporate tax 
cooperation. This means that corporate tax cooperation would be likely to be bundled with 
additional tax policy reforms. For example, exchange of savings information will increase tax 
revenues. Economic effects of tax cooperation in an enlarged European Union 
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In the context of personal income taxation, exchange of savings information would 
reduce tax evasion. The most apparent effect of exchanging savings information with tax 
havens is a significant reduction in tax evasion. Aggregate economic outcomes would vary 
depending on the use of tax revenues. Economic effects of tax cooperation in an enlarged European Union 
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Chapter 5 Concluding remarks 
This study offers new insights to corporate tax policies in the European Union. A number of 
commonly debated issues fall outside the scope of the study and are left to future efforts. 
First, the economic literature has yet to develop and agree on how to model corporate tax 
compliance costs. This study has consequently not taken lower compliance costs into account 
when reporting the gains from corporate tax cooperation. Still, the study implicitly sheds some 
light on the issue on compliance costs. The large adjustments to tax bases that sometimes are 
required by harmonisation indicate that existing de facto rules for calculating taxable corporate 
income differ significantly across countries. This indicates that tax base harmonisation could 
result in sizeable reductions in compliance costs. 
Second, more comprehensive studies should analyse the effects on GDP and welfare of issues 
such as e.g. EU-wide corporate income consolidation (i.e. allowing cross-border loss offsets), 
harmonisation towards the broadest possible tax base, effects of tax cooperation on tax 
competition and increased competition in the Internal Market following tax reforms. By 
including such effects into a broader modelling framework, a more comprehensive analysis of 
the effects of tax cooperation could be performed. This may capture more benefits of tax 
cooperation than is possible in the current model. 
An important conclusion of this study is that gains from corporate tax cooperation cannot be 
taken for granted in this standard modelling framework. Several of the scenarios considered 
result in aggregate GDP and welfare losses, and all scenarios result in losses for some 
member states. To support policy formulation, further studies will be required to analyse more 
dynamic effects, possible compensation mechanisms and the details of specific policy 
proposals. 
The introduction of possible compensation mechanisms would undoubtedly give rise to 
numerous debates. As previously pointed out, identifying winners and losers would be far from 
uncontroversial if compensation mechanisms were to be introduced. For example, if losers 
were defined as those countries where tax revenues fall off as a result of the reforms, the 
implication would be that countries suffering drops in GDP would compensate countries with 
gains in GDP. If, on the other hand, losers were defined as those countries where GDP 
decreases as a result of the reforms, the implication would be that countries suffering drops in 
tax revenues would compensate countries with gains in tax revenues.  
To define policies that are both politically feasible and create proper incentives for member 
states, targeted research is needed. The results of this study show that there can be a 
significant difference in outcomes between policies that seem similar. This suggests that a 
rigorous economic analysis should precede any decision on policy reform. Economic effects of tax cooperation in an enlarged European Union 
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Appendix I Detailed results 


















Austria 0.7 0.2 -17.5 -0.7 -1.5 0.8 2.3 -20.1 0.1
Belgium 3.2 0.7 -30.5 -0.5 -2.0 4.2 10.5 -20.1 43.2
Denmark 1.8 0.4 -27.2 -0.3 -0.7 3.0 7.7 -9.5 57.4
Finland 1.6 0.3 -29.5 -0.6 -1.6 2.3 7.3 -6.4 73.9
France 2.4 0.5 -33.1 -1.0 -2.9 3.4 7.9 -22.4 36.2
Germany -1.6 0.1 49.2 0.6 2.0 -2.4 -6.7 -28.5 -54.6
Greece 1.1 0.3 -13.1 -0.5 -1.2 1.3 2.7 -22.4 -3.2
Ireland -1.0 -0.2 90.4 1.7 2.8 -1.7 -4.0 117.2 7.8
Italy 1.4 0.2 -28.6 -1.5 -5.2 1.4 4.7 -17.7 23.5
Luxembourg 3.7 0.6 -39.0 -3.2 -5.1 4.8 14.4 -10.6 201.7
Netherlands 2.7 0.5 -37.5 -1.4 -3.9 3.9 9.2 -21.3 52.5
Portugal 1.2 0.2 -24.1 -1.2 -4.5 1.8 4.8 -1.3 53.8
Spain 0.4 0.3 -9.6 -0.3 -0.7 0.5 0.8 -22.4 -11.0
Sweden 1.1 0.2 -21.2 -0.4 -1.0 1.6 4.2 -3.0 44.5
UK 2.2 0.3 -38.4 -2.7 -9.6 2.9 10.5 -9.5 122.1
Cyprus -1.2 -0.2 94.6 4.4 47.5 -2.2 -4.3 81.0 -12.7
Czech Rep. 2.3 0.3 -38.1 -2.3 -8.2 3.3 8.7 -3.0 134.5
Estonia -2.4 -0.1 370.4 5.2 56.9 -3.9 -9.2 4.4 -73.4
Hungary 0.5 -0.2 -2.4 0.1 -0.1 0.2 2.0 69.7 162.7
Latvia 0.1 0.0 23.3 1.5 4.9 -0.1 0.2 81.0 98.4
Lithuania 0.4 0.0 7.8 0.9 3.0 0.3 1.6 81.0 176.1
Malta -1.1 0.0 18.2 0.1 0.8 -2.0 -4.1 -22.4 -40.4
Poland -1.1 -0.2 62.4 1.6 3.3 -1.6 -4.3 42.9 -24.0
Slovak Rep. -0.7 -0.2 39.4 2.3 -60.4 -1.1 -2.4 42.9 1.9
Slovenia -1.7 -0.2 79.7 1.3 3.2 -2.8 -6.1 8.6 -48.2
Note: All figures are percentage changes from the baseline.
The harmonised corporate tax rate is 27.2%
The tax base is harmonised at the unweighted average of EU25 tax bases.
Source: CETAX simulations.  Economic effects of tax cooperation in an enlarged European Union 
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Austria 0.4 0.1 -6.7 -0.2 -0.4 0.3 1.1 -4.2 5.6
Belgium 2.4 0.6 -24.4 -0.2 -1.4 3.3 8.6 -4.2 51.2
Denmark 1.3 0.2 -21.0 -0.2 -0.5 2.4 6.3 8.6 66.1
Finland 1.2 0.2 -20.6 -0.3 -0.8 1.8 6.0 12.4 83.5
France 2.0 0.3 -26.1 -0.7 -2.3 2.7 6.6 -6.9 43.7
Germany -2.1 -0.1 71.5 1.3 4.0 -2.9 -8.2 -14.2 -52.1
Greece 0.6 0.2 -4.2 0.0 -0.1 0.7 1.4 -6.9 2.1
Ireland -1.3 -0.3 113.6 2.0 3.4 -2.1 -4.8 160.7 13.7
Italy 1.1 0.1 -17.6 -0.7 -2.6 1.1 3.6 -1.2 30.3
Luxembourg 3.4 0.5 -28.1 -1.7 -2.7 4.5 13.4 7.3 218.3
Netherlands 2.3 0.3 -29.1 -0.8 -2.4 3.4 8.0 -5.5 60.9
Portugal 0.8 0.1 -14.7 -0.6 -2.5 1.3 3.7 18.5 62.3
Spain 0.0 0.1 0.7 0.1 0.2 -0.1 -0.3 -6.9 -6.1
Sweden 0.7 0.0 -12.4 -0.1 -0.4 1.1 3.1 16.4 52.5
UK 1.9 0.2 -29.6 -1.8 -6.6 2.6 9.5 8.6 134.3
Cyprus -1.4 -0.3 119.2 5.6 60.0 -2.6 -5.0 115.1 -7.8
Czech Rep. 2.0 0.2 -29.5 -1.6 -5.8 2.9 7.6 16.0 144.4
Estonia -2.6 -0.2 430.0 6.2 67.5 -4.1 -9.7 25.1 -71.3
Hungary 0.3 -0.4 7.3 0.3 0.7 -0.4 1.4 101.5 173.6
Latvia -0.2 0.0 44.6 2.6 8.3 -0.3 -0.8 115.5 107.7
Lithuania 0.1 -0.1 23.8 1.7 5.7 0.0 0.7 116.7 190.5
Malta -1.4 -0.1 36.4 1.0 4.4 -2.5 -5.2 -6.9 -36.9
Poland -1.3 -0.4 82.1 2.0 4.4 -1.8 -4.8 71.2 -19.7
Slovak Rep. -0.9 -0.3 57.6 3.3 -87.2 -1.5 -3.3 71.2 7.5
Slovenia -1.9 -0.3 101.9 1.9 4.5 -3.0 -6.7 29.7 -44.4
Note: All figures are percentage changes from the baseline.
The harmonised corporate tax rate is 32.6%. The tax base is harmonised at the weighted average of EU25 tax bases.
Source: CETAX simulations.  


















Austria 0.2 0.1 -4.6 -0.1 -0.3 0.2 0.8 -0.9 6.2
Belgium 2.2 0.5 -24.2 -0.3 -1.7 3.0 8.1 -0.9 51.9
Denmark 1.1 0.2 -20.4 -0.2 -0.6 2.2 5.8 12.3 67.0
Finland 1.1 0.1 -18.9 -0.2 -0.7 1.7 5.7 16.2 84.4
France 1.8 0.3 -24.9 -0.7 -2.2 2.5 6.3 -3.7 44.5
Germany -2.3 -0.1 75.9 1.4 4.3 -3.0 -8.6 -11.3 -51.8
Greece 0.4 0.1 -3.4 -0.1 -0.2 0.4 0.9 -3.7 2.6
Ireland -1.3 -0.3 118.0 2.1 3.5 -2.2 -5.0 169.6 14.3
Italy 1.0 0.1 -15.2 -0.6 -2.1 1.0 3.3 2.1 31.0
Luxembourg 3.3 0.5 -25.9 -1.5 -2.2 4.4 13.1 10.9 220.0
Netherlands 2.2 0.3 -27.4 -0.8 -2.2 3.2 7.6 -2.3 61.8
Portugal 0.7 0.0 -13.2 -0.6 -2.3 1.2 3.4 22.5 63.2
Spain -0.1 0.0 2.5 0.1 0.3 -0.2 -0.6 -3.7 -5.6
Sweden 0.6 0.0 -10.7 -0.1 -0.4 0.9 2.8 20.4 53.3
UK 1.9 0.2 -28.1 -1.7 -6.2 2.5 9.2 12.3 135.6
Cyprus 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 -0.4 -0.1 -0.1
Czech Rep. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1
Estonia 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1
Hungary 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
Latvia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1
Lithuania 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1
Malta 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2
Poland 0.0 0.0 -0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1
Slovak Rep. 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.3 -0.1 -0.1
Slovenia 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1
Note: All figures are percentage changes from the baseline.
The harmonised corporate tax rate is 33.7%. The tax base is harmonised at the weighted average of EU15 tax bases.
Source: CETAX simulations.  Economic effects of tax cooperation in an enlarged European Union 
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Austria 0.6 0.1 -10.8 -0.2 -0.6 0.7 2.4 2.0 20.5
Belgium 2.5 0.6 -31.1 -0.5 -2.7 3.6 10.0 2.0 72.4
Denmark 0.0 0.0 -0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.2
Finland 1.4 0.1 -24.0 -0.3 -0.9 2.2 7.2 19.6 109.3
France 2.2 0.3 -31.3 -0.9 -3.0 3.1 7.8 -0.9 64.0
Germany -1.9 -0.1 64.5 1.2 3.7 -2.5 -7.3 -8.7 -45.3
Greece 0.8 0.1 -10.6 -0.3 -0.9 1.1 2.6 -0.9 16.5
Ireland -1.1 -0.4 102.0 1.8 3.0 -1.8 -3.7 177.5 29.7
Italy 1.4 0.1 -21.0 -0.7 -2.8 1.5 4.8 5.1 48.6
Luxembourg 3.7 0.5 -27.8 -1.5 -2.3 4.9 14.6 14.2 263.2
Netherlands 2.6 0.3 -32.6 -0.9 -2.6 3.9 9.2 0.6 83.6
Portugal 1.0 0.0 -19.8 -0.9 -3.6 1.7 4.8 26.2 85.2
Spain 0.3 0.0 -6.5 -0.2 -0.6 0.3 0.9 -0.9 7.1
Sweden 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.2
UK 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 -0.1 -0.2
Cyprus 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 -0.3 -0.1 -0.1
Czech Rep. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1
Estonia 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
Hungary 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
Latvia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1
Lithuania 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1
Malta 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
Poland 0.0 0.0 -0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1
Slovak Rep. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 -0.1 -0.1
Slovenia 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1
Note: All figures are percentage changes from the baseline.
The harmonised corporate tax rate is 34.7%. The tax base is harmonised at the weighted average of Euro zone tax bases.
Source: CETAX simulations.  


















Austria 0.7 0.1 -11.7 -0.3 -0.7 0.7 2.6 2.5 22.8
Belgium 2.6 0.6 -32.2 -0.5 -2.8 3.7 10.3 2.5 75.7
Denmark 0.0 0.0 -0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.2
Finland 1.4 0.1 -24.8 -0.4 -1.0 2.2 7.4 20.2 113.3
France 2.3 0.2 -32.3 -1.0 -3.1 3.2 8.1 -0.4 67.1
Germany -1.9 -0.1 62.9 1.2 3.7 -2.5 -7.1 -8.3 -44.3
Greece 0.8 0.1 -11.7 -0.4 -1.0 1.3 2.8 -0.4 18.7
Ireland 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1
Italy 1.4 0.1 -21.8 -0.8 -2.9 1.6 5.0 5.6 51.5
Luxembourg 3.7 0.5 -28.0 -1.5 -2.3 5.0 14.8 14.7 270.1
Netherlands 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2
Portugal 1.0 0.0 -20.8 -0.9 -3.8 1.8 5.0 26.8 88.7
Spain 0.4 0.0 -7.8 -0.3 -0.7 0.4 1.2 -0.4 9.2
Sweden 0.9 0.0 -18.0 -0.3 -0.8 1.6 4.5 24.5 77.3
UK 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 -0.1 -0.1
Cyprus 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1
Czech Rep. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1
Estonia 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
Hungary 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
Latvia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1
Lithuania 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1
Malta 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
Poland 0.0 0.0 -0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1
Slovak Rep. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 -0.1 -0.1
Slovenia 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1
Note: All figures are percentage changes from the baseline.
The harmonised corporate tax rate is 34.9%. The tax base is harmonised at the weighted average of EU15-A tax bases.
Source: CETAX simulations.  Economic effects of tax cooperation in an enlarged European Union 
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Austria -0.3 0.0 3.5 0.0 0.0 -0.3 -1.2 -8.7 -16.5
Belgium 1.7 0.5 -14.3 0.0 -0.1 2.5 5.8 -8.7 19.5
Denmark 0.7 0.1 -11.7 -0.1 -0.2 1.5 3.7 3.5 31.4
Finland 0.7 0.1 -12.4 -0.2 -0.4 1.2 3.7 7.1 45.1
France 1.3 0.3 -15.7 -0.4 -1.1 1.9 4.1 -11.3 13.7
Germany -2.7 -0.1 90.0 1.5 4.9 -3.4 -10.2 -18.3 -62.1
Greece -0.2 0.1 7.1 0.3 0.9 -0.4 -1.2 -11.3 -19.3
Ireland -1.7 -0.3 138.7 2.3 3.9 -2.6 -6.8 148.5 -10.1
Italy 0.4 0.1 -7.6 -0.4 -1.2 0.5 1.4 -5.9 3.0
Luxembourg 2.8 0.3 -24.9 -1.8 -2.8 3.8 11.2 2.2 151.8
Netherlands 1.6 0.3 -20.8 -0.6 -1.7 2.4 5.6 -10.0 27.3
Portugal 0.3 0.0 -4.3 -0.1 -0.5 0.6 1.5 12.9 28.4
Spain -0.7 0.1 15.0 0.6 1.5 -0.9 -2.6 -11.3 -25.7
Sweden 0.1 0.0 -1.9 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.9 10.9 20.6
UK 1.5 0.2 -22.8 -1.5 -5.2 2.1 7.2 3.5 85.3
Cyprus 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0
Czech Rep. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Estonia 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0
Hungary 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Latvia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Lithuania 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Malta 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Poland 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1
Slovak Rep. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0
Slovenia 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Note: All figures are percentage changes from the baseline.
The harmonised corporate tax rate is 31.1%. The tax base is harmonised at the unweighted average of EU15 tax bases.
Source: CETAX simulations.  


















Austria -0.1 0.0 0.5 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.4 -7.4 -10.4
Belgium 1.9 0.5 -17.5 -0.1 -0.4 2.8 6.7 -7.4 28.2
Denmark 0.0 0.0 -0.7 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.3
Finland 0.9 0.1 -14.9 -0.2 -0.5 1.5 4.5 8.6 55.6
France 1.5 0.3 -18.8 -0.5 -1.4 2.2 4.9 -10.0 21.9
Germany -2.6 -0.1 84.3 1.4 4.7 -3.2 -9.6 -17.1 -59.3
Greece 0.0 0.1 3.6 0.2 0.6 0.0 -0.3 -10.0 -13.4
Ireland -1.6 -0.3 130.9 2.2 3.8 -2.4 -6.1 151.9 -3.6
Italy 0.6 0.1 -10.5 -0.4 -1.5 0.8 2.1 -4.6 10.5
Luxembourg 3.0 0.3 -26.0 -1.8 -2.9 4.1 11.9 3.7 170.0
Netherlands 1.8 0.3 -23.3 -0.7 -1.9 2.8 6.4 -8.7 36.5
Portugal 0.4 0.0 -7.4 -0.3 -1.1 0.9 2.2 14.5 37.7
Spain -0.5 0.1 10.8 0.4 1.1 -0.6 -1.8 -10.0 -20.3
Sweden 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
UK 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
Cyprus 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Czech Rep. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Estonia 0.0 0.0 -0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Hungary 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Latvia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Lithuania 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Malta 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Poland 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1
Slovak Rep. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0
Slovenia 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Note: All figures are percentage changes from the baseline.
The harmonised corporate tax rate is 31.5%. The tax base is harmonised at the unweighted average of Euro zone tax bases.
Source: CETAX simulations.  Economic effects of tax cooperation in an enlarged European Union 
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Austria -0.2 0.0 3.6 0.0 0.1 -0.2 -0.8 -4.0 -10.4
Belgium 1.7 0.4 -15.9 -0.1 -0.4 2.5 6.0 -4.0 28.2
Denmark 0.0 0.0 -0.5 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.3
Finland 0.8 0.1 -12.4 -0.1 -0.4 1.3 4.0 12.5 55.7
France 1.3 0.2 -16.6 -0.4 -1.2 2.0 4.5 -6.8 22.0
Germany -2.7 -0.1 90.6 1.6 5.1 -3.3 -10.0 -14.1 -59.3
Greece -0.2 0.0 6.1 0.3 0.9 -0.2 -0.8 -6.8 -13.4
Ireland 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
Italy 0.5 0.1 -7.3 -0.2 -0.8 0.7 1.7 -1.1 10.5
Luxembourg 2.9 0.3 -23.3 -1.5 -2.4 3.9 11.5 7.4 170.1
Netherlands 0.0 0.0 -0.3 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2
Portugal 0.3 0.0 -4.9 -0.1 -0.6 0.7 1.8 18.6 37.7
Spain -0.6 0.0 13.9 0.5 1.3 -0.8 -2.2 -6.8 -20.3
Sweden 0.2 -0.1 -2.4 0.0 0.1 0.5 1.3 16.5 29.4
UK 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2
Cyprus 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.1
Czech Rep. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
Estonia 0.0 0.0 -0.2 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1
Hungary 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1
Latvia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
Lithuania 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
Malta 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1
Poland 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Slovak Rep. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.1 0.1
Slovenia 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
Note: All figures are percentage changes from the baseline.
The harmonised corporate tax rate is 32.6%. The tax base is harmonised at the unweighted average of EU15-A tax bases.
Source: CETAX simulations.  


















Austria 0.0 0.0 -0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.1
Belgium 1.8 0.4 -20.9 -0.3 -1.6 2.5 6.8 43.2
Denmark 1.5 0.3 -21.4 -0.2 -0.4 2.7 6.7 57.4
Finland 1.5 0.2 -24.9 -0.4 -1.1 2.2 6.9 73.9
France 1.4 0.2 -19.7 -0.6 -1.8 1.9 4.9 36.2
Germany -3.2 -0.3 101.6 1.9 5.9 -3.9 -11.2 -54.6
Greece -0.2 0.0 1.8 0.0 0.0 -0.3 -0.6 -3.2
Ireland 0.1 0.0 -3.9 0.0 -0.1 0.1 0.3 7.8
Italy 0.8 0.1 -13.3 -0.5 -1.8 0.9 2.9 23.5
Luxembourg 3.4 0.5 -31.5 -2.3 -3.6 4.6 13.6 201.7
Netherlands 1.8 0.2 -23.0 -0.6 -1.8 2.7 6.5 52.5
Portugal 1.3 0.2 -21.9 -1.0 -3.9 2.0 5.0 53.8
Spain -0.6 -0.1 10.0 0.3 0.8 -0.8 -1.8 -11.0
Sweden 1.1 0.1 -18.9 -0.3 -0.8 1.7 4.2 44.5
UK 2.1 0.3 -31.8 -2.1 -7.4 2.8 9.9 122.1
Cyprus -0.2 0.0 9.3 0.4 4.1 -0.4 -0.8 -12.7
Czech Rep. 2.3 0.3 -36.1 -2.2 -7.6 3.3 8.6 134.5
Estonia -0.9 0.0 -22.1 -1.1 -11.0 -1.4 -3.6 -73.4
Hungary 1.3 0.2 -38.9 -1.2 -4.4 1.9 5.0 162.8
Latvia 0.9 0.1 -33.7 -1.3 -4.4 1.0 3.4 98.4
Lithuania 1.3 0.1 -41.2 -1.5 -5.7 1.7 5.1 176.2
Malta -1.8 -0.2 52.0 1.6 6.9 -3.2 -6.6 -40.4
Poland -0.4 0.0 18.3 0.4 0.8 -0.6 -1.8 -24.0
Slovak Rep. 0.0 0.0 -1.1 0.0 1.8 0.0 0.0 1.9
Slovenia -1.5 -0.1 65.7 1.0 2.5 -2.4 -5.4 -48.2
Note: All figures are percentage changes from the baseline.
Statutory corporate tax rates are unchanged. The tax base is harmonised at the unweighted average of EU25 tax bases.
Source: CETAX simulations.  Economic effects of tax cooperation in an enlarged European Union 
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Austria 0.2 0.0 -3.7 -0.1 -0.2 0.1 0.7 5.6
Belgium 2.0 0.5 -24.0 -0.3 -1.9 2.8 7.8 51.2
Denmark 1.7 0.3 -23.8 -0.2 -0.4 2.9 7.4 66.1
Finland 1.7 0.3 -27.2 -0.5 -1.2 2.4 7.5 83.5
France 1.6 0.2 -23.0 -0.7 -2.2 2.2 5.7 43.7
Germany -3.0 -0.3 94.1 1.7 5.4 -3.7 -10.5 -52.1
Greece 0.0 0.0 -2.0 -0.1 -0.3 0.0 0.2 2.1
Ireland 0.1 0.0 -6.7 -0.1 -0.2 0.1 0.5 13.7
Italy 1.0 0.1 -16.6 -0.6 -2.4 1.1 3.5 30.3
Luxembourg 3.6 0.6 -32.9 -2.3 -3.7 4.8 14.2 218.3
Netherlands 2.0 0.3 -25.9 -0.7 -2.0 3.0 7.3 60.9
Portugal 1.4 0.2 -24.5 -1.2 -4.4 2.2 5.5 62.3
Spain -0.3 0.0 5.3 0.2 0.4 -0.5 -1.1 -6.1
Sweden 1.2 0.2 -21.6 -0.4 -0.9 1.9 4.7 52.5
UK 2.2 0.3 -33.9 -2.2 -7.9 3.0 10.5 134.3
Cyprus -0.1 0.0 5.7 0.2 2.2 -0.3 -0.6 -7.9
Czech Rep. 2.4 0.3 -38.5 -2.3 -8.2 3.5 9.1 147.5
Estonia -0.9 0.0 -21.8 -1.1 -10.9 -1.5 -3.6 -71.9
Hungary 1.4 0.2 -41.1 -1.2 -4.7 1.9 5.3 177.3
Latvia 0.9 0.1 -36.3 -1.4 -4.8 1.1 3.7 109.3
Lithuania 1.4 0.1 -43.4 -1.6 -6.0 1.8 5.4 191.4
Malta -1.7 -0.2 46.5 1.5 6.2 -2.9 -6.0 -37.1
Poland -0.4 0.0 14.6 0.3 0.6 -0.6 -1.5 -19.8
Slovak Rep. 0.1 0.0 -4.5 -0.2 6.8 0.1 0.3 7.5
Slovenia -1.3 -0.1 60.1 0.9 2.3 -2.3 -4.9 -45.3
Note: All figures are percentage changes from the baseline.
Statutory corporate tax rates are unchanged. The tax base is harmonised at the weighted average of EU25 tax bases.
Source: CETAX simulations.  


















Austria -0.7 -0.1 11.7 0.2 0.6 -0.7 -2.4 -16.5
Belgium 1.0 0.2 -10.5 -0.1 -0.4 1.5 3.8 19.5
Denmark 1.0 0.2 -13.0 -0.1 -0.2 1.8 4.3 31.4
Finland 1.1 0.2 -16.8 -0.3 -0.7 1.7 4.9 45.1
France 0.6 0.1 -8.2 -0.2 -0.6 1.0 2.3 13.7
Germany -4.0 -0.4 127.1 2.3 7.3 -4.7 -13.7 -62.1
Greece -1.0 -0.2 14.5 0.4 1.2 -1.5 -3.3 -19.3
Ireland -0.1 0.0 5.7 0.1 0.1 0.0 -0.3 -10.1
Italy 0.2 0.0 -1.9 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.6 3.0
Luxembourg 2.9 0.3 -26.5 -2.0 -3.2 4.0 11.6 151.8
Netherlands 1.1 0.1 -13.3 -0.3 -0.8 1.8 4.0 27.3
Portugal 0.8 0.1 -12.8 -0.6 -2.2 1.4 3.2 28.4
Spain -1.3 -0.2 26.0 0.9 2.2 -1.7 -4.2 -25.7
Sweden 0.6 0.1 -9.6 -0.1 -0.3 1.0 2.4 20.6
UK 1.6 0.2 -24.5 -1.6 -5.7 2.4 7.9 85.3
Cyprus 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.1
Czech Rep. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
Estonia 0.0 0.0 -0.2 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1
Hungary 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1
Latvia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
Lithuania 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
Malta 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1
Poland 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
Slovak Rep. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.3 0.1 0.1
Slovenia 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
Note: All figures are percentage changes from the baseline.
Statutory corporate tax rates are unchanged. The tax base is harmonised at the unweighted average of EU15 tax bases.
Source: CETAX simulations.  Economic effects of tax cooperation in an enlarged European Union 
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Austria -0.4 -0.1 7.1 0.1 0.4 -0.4 -1.4 -10.4
Belgium 1.3 0.3 -14.4 -0.1 -0.6 2.1 5.1 28.2
Denmark 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.3
Finland 1.3 0.2 -20.0 -0.3 -0.8 2.0 5.8 55.6
France 1.0 0.1 -12.6 -0.3 -1.0 1.5 3.4 21.9
Germany -3.7 -0.4 117.3 2.1 6.8 -4.3 -12.6 -59.3
Greece -0.7 -0.1 9.8 0.3 0.9 -0.9 -2.1 -13.4
Ireland 0.0 0.0 1.9 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 -3.6
Italy 0.5 0.0 -6.3 -0.2 -0.6 0.6 1.6 10.5
Luxembourg 3.1 0.4 -28.6 -2.1 -3.4 4.3 12.5 170.0
Netherlands 1.4 0.2 -17.1 -0.4 -1.1 2.3 5.1 36.5
Portugal 1.0 0.1 -16.3 -0.8 -2.8 1.7 4.0 37.7
Spain -1.0 -0.1 19.8 0.7 1.7 -1.2 -3.1 -20.3
Sweden 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2
UK 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2
Cyprus 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.1
Czech Rep. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1
Estonia 0.0 0.0 -0.3 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.1
Hungary 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1
Latvia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
Lithuania 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
Malta 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.1
Poland 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2
Slovak Rep. 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.4 0.1 0.1
Slovenia 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
Note: All figures are percentage changes from the baseline.
Statutory corporate tax rates are unchanged. The tax base is harmonised at the unweighted average of Euro zone tax bases.
Source: CETAX simulations.  


















Austria -0.4 -0.1 7.1 0.1 0.4 -0.3 -1.4 -10.4
Belgium 1.3 0.3 -14.4 -0.1 -0.6 2.1 5.2 28.2
Denmark 0.0 0.0 -0.2 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.3
Finland 1.3 0.2 -20.0 -0.4 -0.8 2.0 5.8 55.7
France 1.0 0.1 -12.6 -0.3 -1.0 1.5 3.5 22.0
Germany -3.7 -0.4 117.2 2.1 6.8 -4.3 -12.6 -59.3
Greece -0.7 -0.1 9.8 0.3 0.9 -0.9 -2.1 -13.4
Ireland 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2
Italy 0.5 0.0 -6.3 -0.2 -0.5 0.7 1.7 10.5
Luxembourg 3.1 0.4 -28.6 -2.2 -3.4 4.3 12.5 170.1
Netherlands 0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.2
Portugal 1.0 0.1 -16.4 -0.8 -2.8 1.7 4.0 37.7
Spain -1.0 -0.1 19.8 0.7 1.7 -1.2 -3.1 -20.3
Sweden 0.8 0.1 -13.2 -0.2 -0.5 1.4 3.3 29.4
UK 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2
Cyprus 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.4 0.1 0.1
Czech Rep. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1
Estonia 0.0 0.0 -0.3 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.1
Hungary 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1
Latvia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
Lithuania 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
Malta 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.2
Poland 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2
Slovak Rep. 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.4 0.1 0.1
Slovenia 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
Note: All figures are percentage changes from the baseline.
Statutory corporate tax rates are unchanged. The tax base is harmonised at the unweighted average of EU15-A tax bases.
Source: CETAX simulations.  Economic effects of tax cooperation in an enlarged European Union 
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Austria 0.0 0.0 -0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.1
Belgium 1.8 0.4 -20.9 -0.3 -1.6 2.5 6.8 43.2
Denmark 1.5 0.3 -21.3 -0.2 -0.4 2.7 6.7 57.4
Finland 1.5 0.2 -24.9 -0.4 -1.1 2.2 6.9 73.9
France 1.4 0.2 -19.6 -0.6 -1.8 1.9 4.9 36.2
Germany -3.2 -0.3 101.6 1.9 5.9 -3.9 -11.2 -54.6
Greece -0.2 0.0 1.8 0.0 0.0 -0.3 -0.6 -3.2
Ireland -0.4 0.0 45.7 0.9 1.5 -0.7 -1.6 58.0 7.8
Italy 0.8 0.1 -13.3 -0.5 -1.8 0.9 2.9 23.5
Luxembourg 3.4 0.5 -31.5 -2.3 -3.6 4.6 13.6 201.7
Netherlands 1.8 0.2 -23.0 -0.6 -1.8 2.7 6.5 52.5
Portugal 1.3 0.2 -21.9 -1.0 -3.9 2.0 5.0 53.8
Spain -0.6 -0.1 10.0 0.3 0.8 -0.8 -1.8 -11.0
Sweden 1.1 0.1 -18.9 -0.3 -0.8 1.7 4.2 44.5
UK 2.1 0.3 -31.8 -2.1 -7.4 2.8 9.9 122.1
Cyprus -0.6 0.0 42.8 2.0 21.8 -1.0 -2.1 32.2 -12.7
Czech Rep. 2.3 0.3 -36.3 -2.2 -7.7 3.3 8.6 134.5
Estonia -2.3 -0.1 336.5 4.7 51.8 -3.5 -8.5 -73.4
Hungary 1.0 0.1 -25.5 -0.7 -2.7 1.3 4.0 24.2 162.8
Latvia 0.6 0.0 -12.2 -0.2 -0.9 0.7 2.3 32.2 98.4
Lithuania 1.0 0.1 -21.8 -0.5 -2.1 1.2 3.8 32.2 176.2
Malta -1.8 -0.2 51.3 1.6 6.8 -3.1 -6.5 -40.4
Poland -0.5 -0.1 22.9 0.5 1.1 -0.7 -2.0 5.1 -24.0
Slovak Rep. 0.0 0.0 3.3 0.2 -5.3 -0.1 -0.2 5.1 1.9
Slovenia -1.5 -0.1 65.7 1.0 2.5 -2.4 -5.3 -48.2
Note: All figures are percentage changes from the baseline.
The minimum corporate tax rate is 20%. The tax base is harmonised at the unweighted average of EU25 tax bases.
Source: CETAX simulations.  


















Austria 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
Belgium 1.8 0.4 -20.8 -0.3 -1.5 2.5 6.8 43.2
Denmark 1.5 0.3 -21.3 -0.2 -0.4 2.7 6.7 57.4
Finland 1.5 0.2 -24.8 -0.4 -1.1 2.2 6.9 73.9
France 1.4 0.2 -19.6 -0.6 -1.8 1.9 4.9 36.2
Germany -3.2 -0.3 101.7 1.9 5.9 -3.9 -11.2 -54.6
Greece -0.2 0.0 1.9 0.0 0.0 -0.3 -0.6 -3.2
Ireland -0.7 -0.1 77.2 1.5 2.5 -1.2 -2.9 96.7 7.8
Italy 0.8 0.1 -13.3 -0.5 -1.8 0.9 2.9 23.5
Luxembourg 3.4 0.5 -31.5 -2.3 -3.6 4.6 13.6 201.7
Netherlands 1.8 0.2 -23.0 -0.6 -1.7 2.8 6.5 52.5
Portugal 1.3 0.2 -21.8 -1.0 -3.9 2.0 5.0 53.8
Spain -0.6 -0.1 10.1 0.3 0.9 -0.8 -1.8 -11.0
Sweden 1.1 0.1 -18.9 -0.3 -0.8 1.7 4.2 44.5
UK 2.1 0.2 -31.8 -2.1 -7.4 2.8 9.9 122.1
Cyprus -1.0 -0.1 77.4 3.7 39.6 -1.7 -3.5 64.4 -12.7
Czech Rep. 2.3 0.3 -36.3 -2.2 -7.7 3.3 8.6 134.5
Estonia -2.3 -0.1 336.5 4.7 51.8 -3.5 -8.5 -73.4
Hungary 0.7 -0.1 -9.8 -0.1 -0.8 0.6 2.8 54.4 162.8
Latvia 0.3 0.0 10.8 0.9 2.9 0.3 1.1 64.4 98.4
Lithuania 0.6 0.0 -2.2 0.4 1.3 0.8 2.5 64.4 176.2
Malta -1.8 -0.2 51.3 1.6 6.8 -3.1 -6.5 -40.4
Poland -0.8 -0.2 50.3 1.2 2.7 -1.1 -3.2 30.5 -24.0
Slovak Rep. -0.4 -0.1 27.9 1.7 -44.0 -0.7 -1.6 30.5 1.9
Slovenia -1.5 -0.1 65.7 1.0 2.5 -2.4 -5.3 -48.2
Note: All figures are percentage changes from the baseline.
The minimum corporate tax rate is 25%. The tax base is harmonised at the unweighted average of EU25 tax bases.
Source: CETAX simulations.  Economic effects of tax cooperation in an enlarged European Union 
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Austria 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
Belgium 1.8 0.4 -20.7 -0.3 -1.5 2.5 6.8 43.2
Denmark 1.5 0.3 -21.2 -0.2 -0.4 2.7 6.7 57.4
Finland 1.4 0.2 -22.8 -0.4 -0.9 2.1 6.5 3.3 73.9
France 1.4 0.2 -19.6 -0.6 -1.8 1.9 4.9 36.2
Germany -3.2 -0.3 101.8 1.9 5.9 -3.9 -11.2 -54.6
Greece -0.2 0.0 1.9 0.0 0.0 -0.3 -0.6 -3.2
Ireland -1.1 -0.2 106.6 1.9 3.3 -1.8 -4.3 135.3 7.8
Italy 0.8 0.1 -13.3 -0.5 -1.8 0.9 2.9 23.5
Luxembourg 3.4 0.5 -31.5 -2.3 -3.6 4.7 13.6 201.7
Netherlands 1.8 0.2 -23.0 -0.6 -1.7 2.8 6.5 52.5
Portugal 1.0 0.1 -16.5 -0.7 -2.8 1.6 4.1 8.8 53.8
Spain -0.5 -0.1 10.1 0.3 0.9 -0.8 -1.8 -11.0
Sweden 0.9 0.1 -14.4 -0.2 -0.5 1.4 3.5 6.9 44.5
UK 2.1 0.2 -31.8 -2.1 -7.4 2.9 9.9 122.1
Cyprus -1.4 -0.2 110.2 5.2 55.9 -2.4 -4.8 96.7 -12.7
Czech Rep. 2.1 0.3 -32.3 -1.9 -6.6 3.1 8.0 6.9 134.5
Estonia -2.6 -0.1 404.4 5.8 63.0 -3.9 -9.5 14.9 -73.4
Hungary 0.4 -0.3 4.2 0.3 0.6 -0.1 1.6 84.6 162.8
Latvia -0.1 0.0 35.1 2.1 6.7 -0.1 -0.3 96.7 98.4
Lithuania 0.3 -0.1 17.0 1.3 4.5 0.2 1.1 96.7 176.2
Malta -1.8 -0.2 51.3 1.6 6.9 -3.1 -6.5 -40.4
Poland -1.2 -0.3 75.6 1.9 4.0 -1.5 -4.5 56.0 -24.0
Slovak Rep. -0.8 -0.2 51.0 3.0 -78.4 -1.2 -3.0 56.0 1.9
Slovenia -1.9 -0.2 96.4 1.7 4.1 -3.0 -6.7 19.3 -48.2
Note: All figures are percentage changes from the baseline.
The minimum corporate tax rate is 30%. The tax base is harmonised at the unweighted average of EU25 tax bases.
Source: CETAX simulations.  



















Austria 0.0 0.0 -0.2 0.0 0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.1
Belgium 1.3 0.2 -21.0 0.2 3.5 2.2 6.3 43.2
Denmark 1.3 0.2 -21.3 0.0 2.4 2.5 6.4 57.4
Finland 1.2 0.1 -24.8 0.0 1.3 2.0 6.6 73.9
France 0.6 -0.2 -19.7 0.1 4.8 1.4 4.1 36.2
Germany -2.1 0.2 102.2 -0.1 -9.2 -3.3 -10.2 -54.6
Greece -0.2 0.0 1.8 0.0 0.0 -0.3 -0.6 -3.2
Ireland 0.0 0.0 -3.9 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.3 7.8
Italy 0.6 0.0 -13.3 0.1 0.1 0.8 2.7 23.5
Luxembourg 3.0 0.4 -31.3 -0.1 4.0 4.3 13.1 201.7
Netherlands 1.5 0.1 -22.9 0.1 2.1 2.5 6.1 52.5
Portugal 1.0 0.1 -21.9 0.1 2.9 1.8 4.7 53.8
Spain -0.4 0.0 10.0 0.0 -0.7 -0.7 -1.7 -11.0
Sweden 0.9 0.1 -18.8 0.0 0.1 1.5 4.0 44.5
UK 1.7 0.1 -31.6 0.1 1.6 2.6 9.5 122.1
Cyprus -0.2 0.0 9.3 0.0 -0.2 -0.4 -0.7 -12.7
Czech Rep. 1.7 0.0 -36.2 0.1 2.4 2.9 8.1 134.5
Estonia -1.1 -0.1 -22.0 -0.1 0.5 -1.6 -3.8 -73.4
Hungary 0.9 -0.1 -38.9 0.1 2.2 1.6 4.7 162.8
Latvia 0.6 0.0 -33.7 0.0 0.7 0.9 3.2 98.4
Lithuania 0.8 -0.1 -41.2 0.1 1.3 1.4 4.7 176.2
Malta -1.4 0.1 52.0 -0.1 -2.1 -2.8 -6.2 -40.4
Poland -0.2 0.1 18.3 0.0 -0.5 -0.5 -1.6 -24.0
Slovak Rep. 0.0 0.0 -1.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.9
Slovenia -0.8 0.3 65.7 0.0 -4.0 -2.0 -4.9 -48.2
Note: All figures are percentage changes from the baseline.
Labour tax rates are adjusted to keep income transfers constant. The tax base is harmonised at the unweighted average of EU25 tax bases.
Source: CETAX simulations.  Economic effects of tax cooperation in an enlarged European Union 
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Austria -0.5 0.0 11.7 0.0 -1.7 -0.6 -2.3 -16.5
Belgium 0.8 0.2 -10.5 0.0 1.1 1.4 3.5 19.5
Denmark 0.8 0.1 -12.9 0.0 1.4 1.7 4.1 31.4
Finland 0.9 0.1 -16.8 0.0 0.8 1.5 4.6 45.1
France 0.4 -0.1 -8.2 0.0 1.6 0.8 2.0 13.7
Germany -2.7 0.2 127.9 -0.2 -11.2 -3.9 -12.5 -62.1
Greece -0.8 -0.1 14.5 -0.1 -0.6 -1.4 -3.2 -19.3
Ireland -0.1 0.0 5.7 0.0 -0.2 -0.1 -0.3 -10.1
Italy 0.2 0.0 -1.8 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.6 3.0
Luxembourg 2.5 0.2 -26.4 -0.1 3.5 3.7 11.1 151.8
Netherlands 0.9 0.1 -13.2 0.0 1.0 1.6 3.7 27.3
Portugal 0.6 0.0 -12.8 0.0 1.6 1.2 2.9 28.4
Spain -0.9 0.0 26.0 -0.1 -1.7 -1.5 -3.9 -25.7
Sweden 0.5 0.0 -9.6 0.0 0.0 0.9 2.3 20.6
UK 1.3 0.1 -24.4 0.0 1.2 2.2 7.5 85.3
Cyprus 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1
Czech Rep. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
Estonia 0.0 0.0 -0.2 0.0 0.1 0.1
Hungary 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
Latvia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
Lithuania 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
Malta 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
Poland 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.1
Slovak Rep. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
Slovenia 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1
Note: All figures are percentage changes from the baseline.
Labour tax rates are adjusted to keep income transfers constant. The tax base is harmonised at the unweighted average of EU15 tax bases.
Source: CETAX simulations.  



















Austria -0.3 0.0 7.1 0.0 -1.1 -0.3 -1.3 -10.4
Belgium 1.1 0.2 -14.4 0.1 1.5 1.9 4.8 28.2
Denmark 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2
Finland 1.0 0.1 -19.9 0.0 0.9 1.8 5.5 55.6
France 0.6 -0.1 -12.6 0.0 2.5 1.2 3.0 21.9
Germany -2.4 0.2 118.0 -0.1 -10.5 -3.6 -11.5 -59.3
Greece -0.5 0.0 9.8 -0.1 -0.4 -0.8 -2.0 -13.4
Ireland 0.0 0.0 1.9 0.0 -0.1 0.1 0.0 -3.6
Italy 0.4 0.0 -6.2 0.0 0.0 0.6 1.5 10.5
Luxembourg 2.7 0.2 -28.4 -0.1 3.8 4.0 12.0 170.0
Netherlands 1.2 0.1 -17.0 0.0 1.3 2.0 4.8 36.5
Portugal 0.8 0.0 -16.3 0.0 2.1 1.5 3.7 37.7
Spain -0.7 0.0 19.8 -0.1 -1.3 -1.1 -2.9 -20.3
Sweden 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2
UK 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2
Cyprus 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1
Czech Rep. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
Estonia 0.0 0.0 -0.2 0.0 0.1 0.1
Hungary 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
Latvia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
Lithuania 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
Malta 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1
Poland 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.1
Slovak Rep. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
Slovenia 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1
Note: All figures are percentage changes from the baseline.
Labour tax rates are adjusted to keep income transfers constant. The tax base is harmonised at the unweighted average of Euro zone tax bas
Source: CETAX simulations.  Economic effects of tax cooperation in an enlarged European Union 
    Page 55 of 68 



















Austria -0.3 0.0 7.1 0.0 -1.1 -0.3 -1.3 -10.4
Belgium 1.1 0.2 -14.4 0.1 1.5 1.9 4.9 28.2
Denmark 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.3
Finland 1.0 0.1 -19.9 0.0 0.9 1.8 5.5 55.7
France 0.6 -0.1 -12.6 0.0 2.5 1.2 3.0 22.0
Germany -2.4 0.2 118.0 -0.1 -10.5 -3.6 -11.4 -59.3
Greece -0.5 0.0 9.8 -0.1 -0.4 -0.8 -2.0 -13.4
Ireland 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2
Italy 0.4 0.0 -6.3 0.0 0.0 0.6 1.6 10.5
Luxembourg 2.7 0.2 -28.4 -0.1 3.8 4.0 12.0 170.1
Netherlands 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2
Portugal 0.8 0.0 -16.3 0.0 2.1 1.6 3.8 37.7
Spain -0.7 0.0 19.8 -0.1 -1.3 -1.0 -2.9 -20.3
Sweden 0.7 0.0 -13.2 0.0 0.1 1.3 3.1 29.4
UK 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2
Cyprus 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1
Czech Rep. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
Estonia 0.0 0.0 -0.3 0.0 0.1 0.1
Hungary 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
Latvia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
Lithuania 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
Malta 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1
Poland 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.1
Slovak Rep. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
Slovenia 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1
Note: All figures are percentage changes from the baseline.
Labour tax rates are adjusted to keep income transfers constant. The tax base is harmonised at the unweighted average of EU15-A tax bases
Source: CETAX simulations.  




















Austria -0,1 -0,2 -0,3 -0,4 -0,9 -0,4 0,1 -0,1 0,0
Belgium 0,0 -0,1 -0,3 -0,4 -1,3 -0,7 -0,1 -0,1 0,0
Denmark 0,0 0,0 1,6 0,1 0,1 -0,3 0,8 0,0 0,0
Finland 0,0 0,0 -0,1 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,0 0,0 0,0
France 0,0 0,0 -2,6 0,0 0,0 0,2 -0,2 0,0 0,0
Germany 0,0 0,0 0,3 0,0 0,1 -0,1 0,3 0,0 0,0
Greece 0,0 0,0 -0,5 0,0 0,0 0,1 -0,1 0,0 0,0
Ireland 0,0 0,0 -1,7 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,0 0,0 0,0
Italy 0,0 0,0 -0,3 0,0 0,0 0,2 -0,2 0,0 0,0
Luxembourg 0,0 -0,1 2,8 -0,2 -0,3 -0,5 0,6 0,0 0,1
Netherlands 0,0 0,0 -4,0 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,1 0,0 0,0
Portugal 0,0 0,0 -0,5 0,0 0,1 0,2 -0,1 0,0 0,0
Spain 0,0 0,0 5,5 0,1 0,2 -0,4 0,8 0,1 0,1
Sweden 0,0 0,0 -0,8 0,0 0,1 0,0 0,1 0,0 0,0
UK 0,0 0,0 -1,7 0,0 0,1 0,1 0,2 0,0 0,0
Cyprus 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 -0,1 0,0 0,0
Czech Rep. 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Estonia 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,1 -0,1 0,0 0,0
Hungary 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 -0,1 0,0 0,0
Latvia 0,0 0,0 0,3 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Lithuania 0,0 0,0 0,4 0,0 0,0 0,1 -0,1 0,0 0,0
Malta 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 -0,1 0,0 0,0
Poland 0,0 0,0 3,6 0,0 0,0 0,0 -0,1 0,0 0,0
Slovak Rep. 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 -0,1 0,0 0,0
Slovenia 0,0 0,0 0,2 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,0 0,0
Note: All figures are percentage changes from the baseline. The baseline withholding tax for Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg is 15%.
75% of interest income is reported to tax authorities. 'Tax haven bonds' refers to the proportion of household bonds held in the tax haven.
Source: CETAX simulations.  Economic effects of tax cooperation in an enlarged European Union 
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Austria 0,0 -0,2 -0,6 -0,4 -0,8 -0,5 -51,6 0,0 0,1
Belgium 0,0 -0,1 -0,7 -0,4 -1,2 -0,7 -31,3 -0,1 0,0
Denmark 0,0 0,0 3,6 0,2 0,3 -1,3 -77,0 0,2 0,1
Finland 0,0 0,0 -0,3 0,0 0,1 0,1 -58,0 0,0 0,0
France 0,0 0,0 -5,2 0,0 0,1 0,1 -33,7 0,0 0,0
Germany 0,0 0,0 0,6 0,0 0,1 -0,2 -75,2 0,1 0,1
Greece 0,0 0,0 -1,2 0,0 0,1 -0,1 -42,7 0,0 0,0
Ireland 0,0 0,0 -3,4 0,0 0,0 0,0 -51,0 0,0 0,0
Italy 0,0 0,0 -0,6 0,0 0,1 0,3 -26,8 0,0 0,0
Luxembourg 0,0 -0,1 6,3 -0,1 -0,2 -1,3 -82,3 0,1 0,2
Netherlands 0,0 0,0 -11,0 0,0 0,1 0,0 -70,7 0,0 0,0
Portugal 0,0 0,0 -1,2 0,0 0,2 -0,1 -41,6 0,0 0,0
Spain 0,1 0,1 12,6 0,2 0,6 -1,5 -77,3 0,3 0,2
Sweden 0,0 0,0 -1,8 0,1 0,2 -0,5 -58,8 0,1 0,1
UK 0,0 0,0 -3,6 0,1 0,2 0,0 -71,0 0,0 0,0
Cyprus 0,0 0,0 1,5 0,0 -0,1 0,2 -0,2 0,0 0,0
Czech Rep. 0,0 0,0 0,4 0,0 0,0 0,1 -71,6 0,0 0,0
Estonia 0,0 0,0 0,2 0,0 0,0 0,2 -0,3 0,0 0,0
Hungary 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,0 0,0 0,2 -0,2 0,0 0,0
Latvia 0,0 0,0 0,9 0,0 0,1 -0,1 -61,2 0,0 0,0
Lithuania 0,0 0,0 1,1 0,0 0,0 0,1 -41,9 0,0 0,0
Malta 0,0 0,0 0,2 0,0 0,0 0,3 -42,0 -0,1 -0,1
Poland 0,0 0,0 10,4 0,0 0,0 0,0 -52,3 0,0 0,0
Slovak Rep. 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,0 -0,1 0,2 -29,8 0,0 0,0
Slovenia 0,0 0,0 0,5 0,0 0,0 0,1 -77,6 0,0 0,0
Note: All figures are percentage changes from the baseline. The baseline withholding tax for Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg is 15%.
75% of interest income is reported to tax authorities. 'Tax haven bonds' refers to the proportion of household bonds held in the tax haven.
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Austria 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
Belgium -0.6 -0.2 6.3 0.1 0.4 -0.7 -2.0 -10.7
Denmark -0.1 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -1.9
Finland 0.2 0.0 -3.6 -0.1 -0.1 0.4 1.1 8.4
France -0.8 -0.1 10.4 0.3 0.9 -1.0 -2.5 -15.1
Germany 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
Greece 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1
Ireland 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
Italy -1.1 -0.1 16.6 0.6 2.1 -1.2 -3.6 -23.1
Luxembourg 2.0 0.3 -17.9 -1.3 -2.0 2.7 7.8 88.0
Netherlands -0.2 0.0 2.7 0.1 0.2 -0.3 -0.7 -5.0
Portugal -0.1 0.0 2.1 0.1 0.4 -0.2 -0.4 -4.1
Spain 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
Sweden -0.3 -0.1 5.4 0.1 0.2 -0.5 -1.2 -9.9
UK 0.9 0.1 -12.7 -0.8 -2.9 1.2 4.0 38.4
Cyprus 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0
Czech Rep. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Estonia 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Hungary 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Latvia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Lithuania 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Malta 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Poland 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Slovak Rep. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Slovenia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Note: All figures are percentage changes from the baseline.
Statutory corporate tax rates are unchanged. The tax base is harmonised at the unweighted subgroup average.
Source: CETAX simulations.  Economic effects of tax cooperation in an enlarged European Union 
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Austria 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.2
Belgium 0.9 0.2 -10.3 -0.1 -0.9 1.1 3.1 19.5
Denmark 0.9 0.2 -12.8 -0.1 -0.2 1.5 3.8 31.4
Finland 1.0 0.2 -16.7 -0.3 -0.7 1.4 4.5 45.1
France 0.6 0.1 -8.2 -0.2 -0.8 0.7 1.9 13.7
Germany 0.0 0.0 -0.2 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2
Greece -0.1 0.0 -0.4 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3
Ireland 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.2
Italy 0.1 0.0 -2.0 -0.1 -0.5 0.0 0.2 3.0
Luxembourg 2.9 0.5 -26.2 -1.8 -2.8 3.8 11.3 151.8
Netherlands 1.0 0.2 -13.1 -0.3 -1.0 1.5 3.6 27.3
Portugal 0.7 0.1 -12.7 -0.6 -2.3 1.0 2.7 28.4
Spain -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2 -0.2
Sweden 0.5 0.1 -9.7 -0.2 -0.4 0.7 2.0 20.6
UK 1.6 0.2 -24.5 -1.6 -5.6 2.1 7.5 85.3
Cyprus 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 -0.4 -0.1 -0.1
Czech Rep. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1
Estonia 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1
Hungary 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
Latvia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1
Lithuania 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1
Malta 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2
Poland 0.0 0.0 -0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1
Slovak Rep. 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.3 -0.1 -0.1
Slovenia 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1
Note: All figures are percentage changes from the baseline.
Statutory corporate tax rates are unchanged. The tax base is harmonised at the unweighted average for the EU15.
Source: CETAX simulations.  




















Austria 0,0 -0,2 -1,0 -0,4 -0,8 4,2 2,6 0,3 0,4
Belgium 0,0 -0,2 -1,0 -0,4 -1,2 7,4 2,3 0,2 0,2
Denmark 0,0 0,0 1,5 0,1 0,1 -0,2 0,4 0,0 0,0
Finland 0,0 0,0 -0,1 0,0 0,0 0,1 -0,1 0,0 0,0
France 0,0 0,0 -2,5 0,0 0,0 0,2 -0,4 0,0 0,0
Germany 0,0 0,0 0,3 0,0 0,1 -0,1 0,1 0,0 0,0
Greece 0,0 0,0 -0,5 0,0 0,0 0,2 -0,3 0,0 0,0
Ireland 0,0 0,0 -1,6 0,0 0,0 0,1 -0,2 0,0 0,0
Italy 0,0 0,0 -0,3 0,0 0,0 0,2 -0,3 0,0 0,0
Luxembourg 0,0 -0,1 -4,4 -0,3 -0,5 4,1 2,4 0,2 0,3
Netherlands 0,0 0,0 -3,4 0,0 0,0 0,1 -0,1 0,0 0,0
Portugal 0,0 0,0 -0,5 0,0 0,1 0,2 -0,3 0,0 0,0
Spain 0,0 0,0 4,5 0,1 0,2 -0,3 0,4 0,0 0,0
Sweden 0,0 0,0 -0,8 0,0 0,1 0,0 -0,1 0,0 0,0
UK 0,0 0,0 -1,4 0,0 0,1 0,1 0,0 0,0 0,0
Cyprus 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 -0,1 0,0 0,0
Czech Rep. 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Estonia 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,1 -0,2 0,0 0,0
Hungary 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,1 -0,1 0,0 0,0
Latvia 0,0 0,0 0,3 0,0 0,0 0,1 -0,1 0,0 0,0
Lithuania 0,0 0,0 0,4 0,0 0,0 0,1 -0,2 0,0 0,0
Malta 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 -0,1 0,0 0,0
Poland 0,0 0,0 3,5 0,0 0,0 0,0 -0,1 0,0 0,0
Slovak Rep. 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 -0,1 0,0 0,0
Slovenia 0,0 0,0 0,2 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Note: All figures are percentage changes from the baseline. The baseline withholding tax for Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg is 20%.
75% of interest income is reported to tax authorities. 'Tax haven bonds' refers to the proportion of household bonds held in the tax haven.
Source: CETAX simulations.  Economic effects of tax cooperation in an enlarged European Union 
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Austria 0,0 -0,2 -1,3 -0,4 -0,8 4,1 -50,4 0,3 0,4
Belgium 0,0 -0,2 -1,5 -0,4 -1,1 7,4 -29,7 0,2 0,2
Denmark 0,0 0,0 3,5 0,2 0,3 -1,2 -77,1 0,1 0,1
Finland 0,0 0,0 -0,3 0,0 0,1 0,1 -58,1 0,0 0,0
France 0,0 0,0 -5,1 0,0 0,1 0,1 -33,8 0,0 0,0
Germany 0,0 0,0 0,6 0,0 0,1 -0,2 -75,2 0,1 0,0
Greece 0,0 0,0 -1,2 0,0 0,1 -0,1 -42,8 0,0 0,0
Ireland 0,0 0,0 -3,3 0,0 0,0 0,0 -51,0 0,0 0,0
Italy 0,0 0,0 -0,6 0,0 0,1 0,3 -26,9 0,0 0,0
Luxembourg 0,1 -0,1 -1,1 -0,2 -0,4 3,3 -82,0 0,4 0,4
Netherlands 0,0 0,0 -10,4 0,0 0,1 0,0 -70,7 0,0 0,0
Portugal 0,0 0,0 -1,2 0,0 0,2 -0,1 -41,7 0,0 0,0
Spain 0,1 0,1 11,5 0,2 0,5 -1,3 -77,4 0,2 0,2
Sweden 0,0 0,0 -1,7 0,1 0,2 -0,5 -58,9 0,1 0,1
UK 0,0 0,0 -3,4 0,1 0,2 0,1 -71,0 0,0 0,0
Cyprus 0,0 0,0 1,5 0,0 -0,1 0,2 -0,2 0,0 0,0
Czech Rep. 0,0 0,0 0,4 0,0 0,0 0,1 -71,6 0,0 0,0
Estonia 0,0 0,0 0,2 0,0 0,0 0,2 -0,3 0,0 0,0
Hungary 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,0 0,0 0,2 -0,2 0,0 0,0
Latvia 0,0 0,0 0,9 0,0 0,1 -0,1 -61,2 0,0 0,0
Lithuania 0,0 0,0 1,1 0,0 0,1 0,1 -41,9 0,0 0,0
Malta 0,0 0,0 0,2 0,0 0,0 0,3 -42,0 -0,1 -0,1
Poland 0,0 0,0 10,3 0,0 0,0 0,0 -52,3 0,0 0,0
Slovak Rep. 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,0 -0,1 0,2 -29,9 0,0 0,0
Slovenia 0,0 0,0 0,5 0,0 0,0 0,1 -77,6 0,0 0,0
Note: All figures are percentage changes from the baseline. The baseline withholding tax for Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg is 20%.
75% of interest income is reported to tax authorities. 'Tax haven bonds' refers to the proportion of household bonds held in the tax haven.
Source: CETAX simulations.  




















Austria 0,1 -0,1 -2,2 -0,4 -0,5 14,2 7,5 0,9 1,0
Belgium 0,1 -0,1 -2,4 -0,4 -0,5 27,2 7,1 0,8 0,6
Denmark 0,0 0,0 1,5 0,1 0,1 0,0 -0,3 0,0 0,0
Finland 0,0 0,0 -0,1 0,0 0,0 0,1 -0,4 0,0 0,0
France 0,0 0,0 -2,3 0,0 0,0 0,3 -0,6 0,0 0,0
Germany 0,0 0,0 0,2 0,0 0,0 0,0 -0,2 0,0 0,0
Greece 0,0 0,0 -0,4 0,0 0,0 0,3 -0,6 0,0 0,0
Ireland 0,0 0,0 -1,4 0,0 0,0 0,1 -0,5 0,0 0,0
Italy 0,0 0,0 -0,2 0,0 0,0 0,2 -0,5 0,0 -0,1
Luxembourg 0,1 -0,1 -15,1 -0,3 -0,5 13,6 5,6 0,6 0,7
Netherlands 0,0 0,0 -2,4 0,0 0,0 0,1 -0,4 0,0 0,0
Portugal 0,0 0,0 -0,4 0,0 0,0 0,3 -0,7 0,0 0,0
Spain 0,0 0,0 2,7 0,0 0,1 0,0 -0,3 0,0 0,0
Sweden 0,0 0,0 -0,8 0,0 0,1 0,2 -0,5 0,0 0,0
UK 0,0 0,0 -1,0 0,0 0,0 0,2 -0,4 0,0 0,0
Cyprus 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 -0,1 0,0 0,0
Czech Rep. 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,0 0,0 0,0 -0,1 0,0 0,0
Estonia 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,1 -0,3 0,0 0,0
Hungary 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,1 -0,2 0,0 0,0
Latvia 0,0 0,0 0,3 0,0 0,1 0,1 -0,3 0,0 0,0
Lithuania 0,0 0,0 0,3 0,0 0,0 0,1 -0,3 0,0 0,0
Malta 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 -0,2 0,0 0,0
Poland 0,0 0,0 3,3 0,0 0,0 0,1 -0,2 0,0 0,0
Slovak Rep. 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 -0,2 0,0 0,0
Slovenia 0,0 0,0 0,2 0,0 0,0 0,0 -0,1 0,0 0,0
Note: All figures are percentage changes from the baseline. The baseline withholding tax for Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg is 35%.
75% of interest income is reported to tax authorities. 'Tax haven bonds' refers to the proportion of household bonds held in the tax haven.
Source: CETAX simulations.  Economic effects of tax cooperation in an enlarged European Union 
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Austria 0,1 -0,1 -2,5 -0,3 -0,4 14,1 -48,0 1,0 1,0
Belgium 0,1 -0,1 -2,8 -0,4 -0,4 27,2 -26,4 0,8 0,7
Denmark 0,0 0,1 3,5 0,2 0,3 -1,0 -77,2 0,1 0,1
Finland 0,0 0,0 -0,3 0,0 0,1 0,1 -58,2 0,0 0,0
France 0,0 0,0 -4,8 0,0 0,0 0,2 -34,0 0,0 0,0
Germany 0,0 0,0 0,5 0,0 0,1 -0,2 -75,3 0,0 0,0
Greece 0,0 0,0 -1,1 0,0 0,1 0,0 -43,0 0,0 0,0
Ireland 0,0 0,0 -3,1 0,0 0,0 0,1 -51,2 0,0 0,0
Italy 0,0 0,0 -0,5 0,0 0,0 0,3 -27,1 0,0 0,0
Luxembourg 0,2 0,0 -12,2 -0,2 -0,4 12,7 -81,5 0,8 0,9
Netherlands 0,0 0,0 -9,5 0,0 0,1 0,0 -70,8 0,0 0,0
Portugal 0,0 0,0 -1,1 0,0 0,2 0,0 -41,9 0,0 0,0
Spain 0,0 0,0 9,6 0,2 0,4 -1,0 -77,6 0,2 0,1
Sweden 0,0 0,0 -1,8 0,1 0,2 -0,3 -59,0 0,1 0,0
UK 0,0 0,0 -3,0 0,0 0,2 0,1 -71,1 0,0 0,0
Cyprus 0,0 0,0 1,5 0,0 -0,1 0,2 -0,3 0,0 0,0
Czech Rep. 0,0 0,0 0,4 0,0 0,0 0,1 -71,7 0,0 0,0
Estonia 0,0 0,0 0,2 0,0 0,0 0,2 -0,4 0,0 0,0
Hungary 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,0 0,0 0,2 -0,3 0,0 0,0
Latvia 0,0 0,0 0,8 0,0 0,1 0,0 -61,3 0,0 0,0
Lithuania 0,0 0,0 1,1 0,0 0,1 0,1 -42,0 0,0 0,0
Malta 0,0 0,0 0,2 0,0 0,0 0,3 -42,1 -0,1 -0,1
Poland 0,0 0,0 10,1 0,0 0,0 0,1 -52,4 0,0 0,0
Slovak Rep. 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,0 -0,1 0,2 -29,9 0,0 0,0
Slovenia 0,0 0,0 0,5 0,0 0,0 0,1 -77,7 0,0 0,0
Note: All figures are percentage changes from the baseline. The baseline withholding tax for Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg is 35%.
75% of interest income is reported to tax authorities. 'Tax haven bonds' refers to the proportion of household bonds held in the tax haven.
Source: CETAX simulations.  




















Austria 0,0 -0,2 -1,0 -0,4 -0,8 4,2 2,7 0,3 0,4
Belgium 0,0 -0,2 -1,0 -0,4 -1,1 7,2 2,4 0,2 0,2
Denmark 0,0 0,0 1,4 0,1 0,1 -0,2 0,2 0,0 0,0
Finland 0,0 0,0 -0,1 0,0 0,0 0,1 -0,2 0,0 0,0
France 0,0 0,0 -1,8 0,0 0,0 0,2 -0,3 0,0 0,0
Germany 0,0 0,0 0,3 0,0 0,1 -0,1 0,1 0,0 0,0
Greece 0,0 0,0 -0,4 0,0 0,0 0,2 -0,3 0,0 0,0
Ireland 0,0 0,0 -1,3 0,0 0,0 0,1 -0,2 0,0 0,0
Italy 0,0 0,0 -0,2 0,0 0,0 0,2 -0,3 0,0 0,0
Luxembourg 0,0 -0,1 -4,6 -0,3 -0,4 4,2 2,4 0,2 0,3
Netherlands 0,0 0,0 -3,4 0,0 0,0 0,1 -0,1 0,0 0,0
Portugal 0,0 0,0 -0,4 0,0 0,0 0,2 -0,3 0,0 0,0
Spain 0,0 0,0 5,1 0,1 0,2 -0,2 0,3 0,0 0,0
Sweden 0,0 0,0 -0,7 0,0 0,1 0,1 -0,2 0,0 0,0
UK 0,0 0,0 -1,5 0,0 0,1 0,1 -0,1 0,0 0,0
Cyprus 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 -0,1 0,0 0,0
Czech Rep. 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Estonia 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,1 -0,2 0,0 0,0
Hungary 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 -0,1 0,0 0,0
Latvia 0,0 0,0 0,2 0,0 0,0 0,1 -0,1 0,0 0,0
Lithuania 0,0 0,0 0,3 0,0 0,0 0,1 -0,2 0,0 0,0
Malta 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 -0,1 0,0 0,0
Poland 0,0 0,0 3,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 -0,1 0,0 0,0
Slovak Rep. 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 -0,1 0,0 0,0
Slovenia 0,0 0,0 0,2 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Note: All figures are percentage changes from the baseline. The baseline withholding tax for Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg is 15%.
50% of interest income is reported to tax authorities. 'Tax haven bonds' refers to the proportion of household bonds held in the tax haven.
Source: CETAX simulations.  Economic effects of tax cooperation in an enlarged European Union 
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Austria -0,1 -0,2 0,2 -0,4 -0,9 -3,6 -1,6 -0,3 -0,2
Belgium -0,1 -0,1 0,2 -0,3 -1,4 -6,2 -1,8 -0,3 -0,2
Denmark 0,0 0,0 1,5 0,1 0,1 -0,4 1,1 0,1 0,0
Finland 0,0 0,0 -0,2 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,1 0,0 0,0
France 0,0 0,0 -3,2 0,0 0,0 0,1 -0,1 0,0 0,0
Germany 0,0 0,0 0,2 0,0 0,1 -0,1 0,4 0,0 0,0
Greece 0,0 0,0 -0,6 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,0 0,0 0,0
Ireland 0,0 0,0 -1,8 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,1 0,0 0,0
Italy 0,0 0,0 -0,4 0,0 0,0 0,2 -0,1 0,0 0,0
Luxembourg -0,1 -0,1 7,6 -0,2 -0,3 -3,7 -0,7 -0,2 -0,1
Netherlands 0,0 0,0 -3,9 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,2 0,0 0,0
Portugal 0,0 0,0 -0,6 0,0 0,1 0,1 0,0 0,0 0,0
Spain 0,0 0,0 5,0 0,1 0,2 -0,5 1,0 0,1 0,1
Sweden 0,0 0,0 -0,9 0,0 0,1 -0,1 0,4 0,0 0,0
UK 0,0 0,0 -1,5 0,0 0,1 0,1 0,4 0,0 0,0
Cyprus 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 -0,1 0,0 0,0
Czech Rep. 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Estonia 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,1 -0,1 0,0 0,0
Hungary 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 -0,1 0,0 0,0
Latvia 0,0 0,0 0,3 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Lithuania 0,0 0,0 0,4 0,0 0,0 0,1 -0,1 0,0 0,0
Malta 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Poland 0,0 0,0 3,7 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Slovak Rep. 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Slovenia 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,2 0,0 0,0
Note: All figures are percentage changes from the baseline. The baseline withholding tax for Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg is 15%.
100% of interest income is reported to tax authorities. 'Tax haven bonds' refers to the proportion of household bonds held in the tax haven.
Source: CETAX simulations.  
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Appendix III Model description 
The policy scenarios have been tested in CETAX, a simulation model based on the OECDTAX 
model developed by Peter Birch Sørensen (Sørensen, 2001; 2004b). The OECDTAX model 
was developed specifically for the purpose of studying cooperation on corporate tax policies. It 
has already been applied to a wide range of policy issues that are relevant in the current 
context; corporate tax harmonization in the EU, corporate tax reform in Germany and 
reductions in corporate tax rates across the EU financed by higher labour income taxes 
(Sørensen, 2002; 2004a; 2004b). 
Introduction 
The CETAX model is a CGE model describing the international spill-over effects of national tax 
policies via the world capital market. The model features private portfolio composition, 
endogenous corporate financial policies, incorporation of a housing market, a distinction 
between foreign direct investment and foreign portfolio investment, explicit modelling of the 
financial sector and a detailed description of tax systems. The model can be used both to 
analyse the effects of unilateral changes in tax policies and of various forms of international tax 
cooperation.  
Each of the countries in the model is modelled with a household sector, a business sector and 
a government, and all countries are linked together via international capital markets and trade 
in goods and services (Figure 1 provides an overview of the model structure). 
The government of each country provides infrastructure, other public goods and transfers. The 
expenditures are financed through collection of revenues from a long list of direct taxes on 
capital and labour, and indirect taxes on goods and services. Economic effects of tax cooperation in an enlarged European Union 
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The CETAX model is characterized by a high degree of institutional realism with regard to 
capital markets and capital taxation. This section outlines the main features of the model. An 
exhaustive list of model features can be found in the OECDTAX model documentation 
(Sørensen, 2001). 
The world economy is modelled as consisting of two regions, the European Union, 
corresponding to the individual EU25 countries, and the Rest of the World (ROW)10. One 
country in the ROW is a tax haven that facilitates tax evasion. Each country produces the same 
homogenous good, which is traded in an integrated international goods market. 
Capital is imperfectly mobile across nations, and the supply of capital to an individual country is 
an increasing function of the rate of return offered in that country. By parametrically varying the 
elasticity of substitution between assets invested in different countries, it is possible to adjust 
the degree of capital mobility. The model is specifically designed to allow for higher capital 
mobility within the EU than between the EU and the rest of the world.  
Businesses are modelled as either purely domestic firms with no international operations or as 
multinational parent companies with fully owned subsidiaries in each of the other countries of 
the world. All subsidiaries are thus 100% owned by their parents. Each country is endowed 
with a fixed stock of intangible assets representing e.g. human capital and management know-
how. An exogenous fraction of these assets is allocated to multinationals, the rest to domestic 
firms. Figure 2 provides a graphical representation of the main flows of capital within the 
business sector.  Domestic firms issue debt to both domestic and foreign investors, in addition 
to purchasing labour services from domestic households. 
                                                           
10 The ROW region consists of Australia, Canada, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, Turkey, the 
United States and a tax haven jurisdiction. Economic effects of tax cooperation in an enlarged European Union 
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By contrast, multinational corporations issue shares as well as debt instruments to foreign as 
well as domestic household and institutional investors. The multinational parent companies 
inject equity into foreign subsidiaries, representing foreign direct investment, and provide their 
subsidiaries with intermediate inputs. Subsidiaries also borrow in the host country capital 
market. 
Multinationals have the possibility to engage in transfer pricing to shift taxable profits between 
parent and subsidiaries. Accompanying distortions to input prices are assumed to incur 
organisational costs. Factor demands and financial policies are chosen to maximize global 
after-tax profits.  
Figure 2: Overview of capital flows within the business sector 
 
Consumers choose to either consume their endowments immediately or to postpone some 
consumption and invest in financial assets or housing equity. The distribution of savings across 
different instruments is described in Figure 3. The consumer allocates his financial saving 
across institutional saving and household saving in different countries. Institutional saving 
represents e.g. pension funds, whereas household saving corresponds to e.g. bank deposits 
and direct purchases of bonds and shares. Assets are allocated to maximize after-tax returns, 
Equity
National endowment of intangible assets











Foreign investors  Domestic investors 
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creating incentives to increase savings when the real rate of return increases and to invest 
abroad to evade domestic tax 
Figure 3: Allocation of savings 
 
Being static, the model does not illustrate the dynamics of capital stock adjustment and does 
not include adjustment costs. In this sense, the model describes a long run equilibrium. On the 
other hand the model assumes that national endowments of intangible assets are fixed. In the 
very long run such assets may become mobile internationally, so the time horizon of the model 
may best be thought of as a medium to long run of about 10 years. 
Taxes 
Real world tax codes are complex and distinguish between e.g. foreign direct investment and 
foreign portfolio investment, between household investors and institutional investors, between 
different asset types, between current income and capital gains, and between debt and equity. 
The model provides a detailed representation of capital taxation, incorporating the above 
mentioned distinctions, with a variety of exogenous taxes. 
Direct taxes can e.g. be levied on corporate profits, interest income, dividends and capital 
gains, as well as on labour income and housing consumption. It is possible to differentiate 
between different types of investors with both short and long term investments. Indirect taxes 
exist on non-durable consumer goods and housing construction. 
A wide range of policy variables allows fine-tuning of the model to closely describe national tax 
systems. This includes qualitative features like tax credit mechanisms, deduction rules, specific 
treatment of speculative investments, and the extent of residence-based taxation for different 
investors and assets. It is furthermore possible to apply a wide range of withholding taxes. 
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International double tax relief is comprehensively modelled to take the diversity of current tax 
systems properly into account. 
Overview of model variables 
The CETAX model contains more than 300 variables. A brief overview of the main groups of 
exogenous and endogenous variables is provided in Table 1. 
Table 1: CETAX model variables 
Exogenous variables    Endogenous variables 
Endowments   Outputs 
Technology   Factor  inputs 
Preferences   Capital  stocks 
Scale parameters    Portfolio holdings 
Policy variables    Effective tax rates 
   Net  profits 
   Net  revenues 
   Wages 
   Unemployment 
Source: CETAX model. 
 
Model extensions 
For the purpose of the current study the CETAX model has been adapted and customised to 
the specific needs of the Commission. The following necessary extensions and revisions have 
been implemented: 
1.  The original OECDTAX model represents 24 OECD countries, including the 
current 15 EU Member States. The CETAX model has been extended to include 
all new member states, covering the whole EU25.  
2.  The representation of taxes in the model has been updated and revised to 
properly represent all the taxes important to the study and to allow for the 
subsequent scenario analysis.  
3.  The model database has been updated and extended to account both for the 
geographical extension with the new member states and for new model features. 
The primary data source is the OECD. 
4.  The enlargement and the tax policy scenarios have been translated into model 
language and implemented to allow for policy analysis. 
5.  The reporting of the results from the model has been updated and customised to 
the requirements of the European Commission. 
 
Calibration principles 
The simultaneity of the model means that most endogenous variables depend on all model 
parameters, but some parameters can be assigned the task of generating realistic values of 
certain endogenous variables (Sørensen, 2001). When calibrating the model, parameters for 
initial endowments of e.g. wealth and intangible assets have thus been chosen so as to 
generate realistic levels of GDP and national income. Labour market parameters have been 
set to replicate current unemployment rates and financial sector fees have been set to produce 
plausible values of the financial sector income ratio in individual countries. In this way, 
calibration and the choice of parameter values have been performed much in the same way as 
in previous applications of the OECDTAX model (e.g. Sørensen, 2002; 2004a; 2004b). The 
primary data source for the calibration has been OECD national accounts and OECD revenue 
data, supplemented with various national sources for some of the new member states. 
The most contentious calibration issue in the context of this study is the calibration of the 
parameter that initially defines the broadness of the tax base, i.e. the rate of depreciation for Economic effects of tax cooperation in an enlarged European Union 
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tax purposes. The parameter is calibrated to replicate the empirically observed ratio of 
corporate tax revenue to GDP. The numerical value of the parameter will consequently be 
model-specific. Proper calibration of the parameter is strongly dependent on reported corporate 
tax revenues. This figure tends to vary significantly, both between different data sources (e.g. 
OECD and Eurostat) and between years. Individual country results may consequently vary 
according to which data the model is calibrated to. The aggregate effects are, however, less 
affected by this issue. The corporate tax revenue data and corporate tax rates used for the 
calibration of the rate of depreciation for tax purposes are provided in Table 2. Because the 
most recent revenue statistics for corporate income taxes cover the year 2001, corporate tax 
rates for 2001 have been used to maintain consistency in the calibration. 
Table 2: Tax data used for calibrating the rate of depreciation for tax purposes 
  Taxes on corporate income as 
percentage of GDP  Corporate tax rate (2001) 
Austria 3.1  34  % 
Belgium 3.6  40  % 
Denmark 3.1  30  % 
Finland 4.9  29  % 
France 3.4  35  % 
Germany 0.6  39  % 
Greece 3.4  37  % 
Ireland 3.6  20  % 
Italy 3.6  36  % 
Luxembourg 7.5  37  % 
Netherlands 4.1  35  % 
Portugal 3.6  35  % 
Spain 2.8  35  % 
Sweden 2.9  28  % 
United Kingdom  3.5  30 % 
Cyprus 2.4  25  % 
Czech Rep.  4.2  31 % 
Estonia 0.7  26  % 
Hungary 2.4  18  % 
Latvia 2.0  22  % 
Lithuania 2.0  15  % 
Malta 2.4  35  % 
Poland 2.0  28  % 
Slovak Rep.  2.2  25 % 
Slovenia 1.4  25  % 
Note: The corporate tax rate is applied equally to retained and distributed profits, except for the case of Estonia, 
where retained profits are tax exempt.  
Source: Eurostat (2003), Martinez-Serrano & Patterson (2003), OECD (2003), KPMG (2001) and own calculations 
based on national accounts. 
 
The model baseline reflects the corporate tax rates in force in 2004, which are reported in 
Table 3. Primary sources for tax data are Eurostat (2003), Eurostat (2004), Sørensen (2004a), 
Martinez-Serrano and Patterson (2003), Danish Ministry of Taxation (2004) and ZEW (2003). Economic effects of tax cooperation in an enlarged European Union 
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Table 3: Corporate tax rates in the model baseline 
  Corporate tax rate (2004) 
Austria  34 % 
Belgium  34 % 
Denmark  30 % 
Finland  29 % 
France  35 % 
Germany  38 % 
Greece  35 % 
Ireland  12,5 % 
Italy  33 % 
Luxembourg  30 % 
Netherlands  34,5% 
Portugal  27,5 % 
Spain  35 % 
Sweden  28 % 
United Kingdom  30 % 
Cyprus  15 % 
Czech Rep.  28 % 
Estonia  26 % 
Hungary  16 % 
Latvia  15 % 
Lithuania  15 % 
Malta  35 % 
Poland  19 % 
Slovak Rep.  19 % 
Slovenia  25 % 
Note: The corporate tax rate is applied equally to retained and distributed profits, except for the case of Estonia, 
where retained profits are tax exempt. 
Source: Eurostat (2004), KPMG (2004), Danish Ministry of Taxation (2004) and ZEW (2003). 
 
Table 4 shows the values of some selected elasticities in the model. The source of all model 
elasticities is Sørensen (2002, 2004b). The substitution elasticities between different types of 
assets and international transaction cost parameters have thus been chosen to generate 
realistic patterns of portfolio composition. Crucially, the elasticities generate an equilibrium 
where interest rates differentials are relatively small across the OECD, as empirically observed. 
Table 4: Selected model elasticities 
Parameter  Value 
Elasticity of saving with respect to the after-tax rate of return  0.2 
Elasticity of labour supply with respect to the after-tax wage rate  0.2 
Elasticity of substitution between housing assets and financial assets  1.0 
Elasticity of substitution between household saving and institutional saving  1.0 
Elasticity of substitution between stocks and bonds  4.0 
Elasticity of substitution between foreign and domestic stocks held by households  3.5 
Elasticity of substitution between foreign and domestic bonds held by households  4.0 
Source: Sørensen (2002, 2004b). 
 
 